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Plaintiff-appellant United Park City Mines Company ("United Park") submits this 
Reply Brief in its appeal from the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing 
United Park's Amended Complaint against defendants-appellees Atlantic Richfield Company 
("ARCO"), successor to The Anaconda Company ("Anaconda"); ASARCO, INC. ("ASARCO"); 
Greater Park City Company ("GPCC"), and its parent, Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. 
("AMOT"); Royal Street Land Company, Deer Valley Resort Company, Royal Street of 
Utah and Royal Street Development Company, Inc. (collectively "Royal Street"); Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York ("Morgan"), Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia 
("Fidelity"), and their wholly owned subsidiaries Greater Properties, Inc. ("GPI"), and 
Park Properties, Inc. ("PPI") (collectively "Morgan-Fidelity"); and intervenor-appellee 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). 
INTRODUCTION 
United Park's First Amended Complaint arises out of two sets of complicated 
agreements executed in 1971 and 1975 and involves numerous claims and parties. The 
1971 Resort Agreements created GPCC, with United Park selling to it the Park City Ski 
Resort, including all its facilities and personal property, some 4,000 acres of prime 
development property and valuable water rights for the discounted price of $6 million 
payable over time, and leasing to it nearly 6,000 acres for ski runs for nominal 
consideration. In return United Park received the right to participate in the growth of 
the Park City Ski Resort as GPCC's major shareholder and senior secured creditor. The 
1975 Resort Agreements restructured GPCC, profoundly altering the ownership interests 
in GPCC's valuable assets, solely at the expense of United Park. United Park continued 
to sell its properties and water rights for the discounted 1971 prices but with further 
extended payments—even though defendants valued the development properties alone at 
nearly $40 million, the skiing operations were worth more than $15 million, and the water 
rights over $2 million. United Park gave away its major equity interest in GPCC for 
1 
nothing and extended the Ski Leases on its land for another forty years for no significant 
change in the already nominal consideration. 
The Amended Complaint alleges that Anaconda (now ARCO)1 and ASARCO, Inc., 
United Park's controlling shareholders in 1975, caused United Park to give away for 
grossly inadequate consideration its valuable interests in Park City skiing operations, 
development properties and water rights to protect their interests in Park City Ventures, 
a mining joint venture. The Amended Complaint alleges that Anaconda and ASARCO thus 
breached their fiduciary duties to United Park and its outside shareholders, and that the 
other defendants either breached their own fiduciary duties to United Park or aided and 
abetted the breaches of the others by overreaching to the detriment of United Park. In 
addition to the fiduciary duty claims, United Park alleges that United Park is entitled to 
reformation of the Water Agreement and the Ski Leases, that GPCC and Royal Street 
have breached certain terms of the contracts between the parties and that GPCC has 
trespassed upon United Park's property. 
Almost immediately after the Amended Complaint was filed, Anaconda and 
ASASRCO moved to disqualify United Park's counsel amd obtained a stay of discovery 
until November 1989. The very order that lifted the stay established the briefing 
schedule for defendants' summary judgment motions, filed three weeks later. Defendants' 
motions were inherently fact-specific and based on grounds that court after court has 
held are particularly suited for jury determination. The district court purported to find 
no genuine issue of material fact as to any of United Park's claims, even though this 
Court had recently emphasized that such "close calls are for juries, not judges, to make.11 
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989). 
United Park's opening brief establishes that the facts are not even a "close call," 
and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Defendants attempt to 
1
 For consistency and ease of reference, "Anaconda" refers to both Anaconda and 
ARCO. 
2 
support the district court's findings, but simply prove the existence of numerous disputed 
issues of fact, Le., whether Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park or directed 
the actions of its Board; whether the 1975 Resort Agreements were fair and in the best 
interest of United Park; whether defendants breached fiduciary duties or knowingly 
participated in breaches of fiduciary duty; whether defendants and the United Park Board 
misrepresented or concealed material facts from outside shareholders; whether United 
Park's outside directors were independent, fully informed of all material facts and willing 
to assert claims on behalf of United Park and its outside shareholders; whether United 
Park should have discovered any fiduciary duty breaches before 1985; whether United 
Park is entitled to reformation of the Water Agreement and Ski Leases; and whether 
GPCC or Royal Street have breached certain terms of the 1975 Resort Agreements. 
Defendants include two additional attacks in an attempt to convince this Court 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact. First, they assert that United Park's 
opposition to defendants' summary judgment motions rested solely on "inadmissible 
statements" in United Park's affidavits, but the affidavits are admissible and in any event 
the great majority of facts supporting United Park's claims do not rely on them. Second, 
defendants contend that United Park has had sufficient opportunity for discovery, when 
they have effectively precluded any discovery since the filing of the Amended Complaint 
and the previously conducted discovery was not directed at the issues raised in their 
motions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO 
STRIKE UNITED PARK'S AFFIDAVITS. 
The district court correctly denied defendants' motions to strike four of six 
affidavits submitted by United Park as violations of the hearsay, parol evidence and best 
evidence rules. (R. 7859-62) These included the affidavits of David Bernolfo, the 
current president of United Park, Edwin L. Osika, Jr., the current secretary, Louis 
Callister, an attorney who previously represented United Park in this litigation, and 
3 
Harold Taylor, former mayor of Park City and head of real estate sales for GPCC. Royal 
Street, joined by AMOT and GPCC, again argue that the affidavits should be stricken to 
convince this Court that the district court "properly granted summary judgment because 
affidavits that contain virtually no admissible evidence create no genuine issues of 
material fact." Royal Street ("R.S.") Br. at 35. 
Defendants1 motion to strike was groundless because the affidavits clearly were 
admissible. They either summarized documents and other evidence submitted to the 
district court as exhibits, were based on personal knowledge, or were offered for a 
purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. Equally important, the great 
majority of facts that contradict the district court's findings are not based on United 
Park's affidavits, but on the exhibits, deposition testimony, and other evidence in the 
record. Even if a particular statement were inadmissible, the proper remedy would be 
to strike the statement, not the entire affidavit. Royal Street does not identify a single 
fact in United Park's brief that relies solely on an allegedly inadmissible statement in an 
affidavit. For the reasons stated below, striking part of any affidavit would have no 
material effect on United Park's appeal. 
A. United Park's Affidavits Are Properly Admissible. 
Royal Street asserts that portions of United Park's affidavits violate the hearsay, 
best evidence and parol evidence rules because they summarize the agreements, other 
documents, and the deposition record. R.S. Br. at 25-27. These objections are frivolous 
because United Park submitted the documents as exhibits to the district court. (R. 4868-
6777) "Best evidence" is not a proper objection when the underlying records are before 
the court. See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 
cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984). Parol evidence is admissible "when the original 
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court 
without great loss of time and the evidence sought from them is only the general result 
of the whole." Utah Code Ann. §78-25-16(5). 
4 
United Park's affidavits were properly admissible as summaries of the record 
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 1006, which provides that the ucontents of voluminous writings, 
recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be 
presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation." Such summaries are not 
hearsay, and need not be based on personal knowledge. See, e.g., Moore v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1986); FTC v. Hughes, 710 F.Supp. 
1520, 1524 (N.D. Tex. 1989). 
Significantly, Royal Street does hot attempt to prove any summary inaccurate.2 
Royal Street merely complains, for example, that many paragraphs in the Bernolfo 
affidavit "purport to describe in minute detail the provisions of the 1971 and 1975 
agreements and related documents, as well as editorializing about the rights and 
obligations of the parties." In a footnote, Royal Street argues rhetorically that "if the 
only purpose of the affidavits was to 'summarize' the record, one wonders why they were 
filed at all." R.S. Br. at 27 & n.6. The answer is straightforward: to summarize relevant 
documents, deposition testimony, and other evidence too voluminous and complex to 
review in the original and to clarify the facts and issues. That is the purpose of Utah 
R. Evid. 1006 and the exception to the parol evidence rule codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§78-25-16(5). 
Royal Street also makes foundation and hearsay objections to portions of United 
Park's affidavits addressing United Park's investigation and discovery of its claims, 
including the "detailed recitations of Mr. Bernolfo's discussions with a variety of people" 
in paragraphs 68-101 of his affidavit. R.S. Br. at 30. These discussions, however, bear 
directly on the issues raised by defendants' statute of limitations motions — including 
defendants' concealment of material facts, United Park's knowledge of its claims, and 
2
 Even if Royal Street made the attempt, the showing would go to the weight of the 
summary, not its admissibility. See, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Bendectin 
Products Liability Litigation, 624 F.Supp. 1212, 1224-26 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd., 857 F.2d 
790 (6th Cir. 1988), cert, denied sub, nom., 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). 
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its diligence in pursuing them, Bernolfo's detailed discussion of United Parkfs 
investigation — all of which he conducted personally or directed United Park employees 
to conduct — establishes that defendants continued to conceal information even after 
Bernolfo became president in 1985, that United Park exerted reasonable if not 
exceptional diligence to discover its claims, and that United Park could not have 
discovered the fiduciary duty claims until after formal discovery on United Park's initial 
complaint. Royal Street 's attempt to strike these paragraphs as "hearsay" misses the 
point. See, e^g., Durfey v. Board of Education, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1979) (evidence 
offered for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted is not excludable 
as hearsay)-3 
B. Striking Portions Of United Park's Affidavits Would Have No Effect On 
United Park's Appeal. 
Even if any statement in an affidavit were inadmissible, the remedy would be to 
strike the statement, not the entire affidavit. See, e.g., Lee v. National Life Assur. Co., 
632 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1980). Royal Street does not identify a single fact in United 
Park's brief that would be affected. The great majority of facts that support United 
Park's appeal do not rely on the affidavits, but on the documentary record, deposition 
testimony, and defendants' admissions.4 
Virtually none of the facts that contradict the district court's statute of 
limitations findings, for example,, rely on the affidavits. United Park establishes 
3
 Royal Street objects to the discussions in the Bernolfo and Callister affidavits of 
their meetings with former director S.N. Cornwall. See R.S. Br. at 30-31. Cornwall 
told Bernolfo and Callister that "he had been told by GPCC officers that the United Park 
properties had no value in 1975," that the ski resort was losing money, and that GPCC 
faced bankruptcy if United Park did not agree to the proposal. (R. 4802-03; 4786-87) 
But the meetings are evidence of matters other than the truth of the statements. The 
meetings occur shortly before United Park filed its initial complaint, and explain why 
United Park believed that the other defendants had withheld essential information from 
Anaconda and ASARCO. It was not until after formal discovery began that United Park 
learned that Anaconda and ASARCO had known this information. 
4AMOT also argues that the affidavits are insufficient to create genuine issues of 
fact, AMOT Br. at 16, but none of the facts that United Park cites in its brief, or infra 
at 35-39, to establish AMOT's liability rely on the affidavits. 
6 
Anaconda's and ASARCO's control of United Park and their breaches of fiduciary duty 
through the public record (including stock ownership and election of employees as 
directors), the deposition testimony of former Anaconda official Clark Wilson and others, 
and internal correspondence and memoranda. United Park also establishes defendants' 
concealment of material facts through deposition testimony and the documentary record, 
including the minutes of the May 27, 1975 annual shareholder's meeting and the October 
2, 1975 special meeting, the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement, the internal GPCC 
memoranda valuing United Park's properties, the Gartner letter, and the letters and 
telegrams sent to the few shareholders who raised questions about the 1975 Resort 
Agreements. 
If Royal Street really believed that the affidavits were crucial, Royal Street would 
have chosen an example that strikes at the heart of United Park's appeal. But Royal 
Street chooses paragraph 40 from the Bernolfo affidavit, which summarizes the terms of 
the 1971 and 1975 Resort Agreements and provides general background. Royal Street 
does not dispute the accuracy of any statement in paragraph 40. Most significant, Royal 
Street has admitted or asserted most of the facts in paragraph 40 to which it objects.5 
5
 For example, Royal Street objects to Bernolfo's statement in paragraph 40 that 
ff[u]nder the 1971 Land Agreement, United Park agreed to sell 4,200 acres of real 
property suitable for commercial, condominium and subdivision development, together with 
the resort base facilities, golf course, and other resort improvements and personal 
property of the existing resort for the sum of $5,400,000." R.S. Br. at 28-9. But Royal 
Street states in its brief that in "February 1971, GPCC, United Park and RSDC entered" 
the Land Purchase Agreement, by which "United Park agreed to sell GPCC approximately 
4,200 acres of real property suitable for commercial, condominium and subdivision 
development, together with the base facilities, golf course, other resort improvements 
and the personal property of the existing resort operations for the sum of $5,574,000, 
payable over time." Id. at 12. 
Royal Street objects to Bernolfo's statement, "due to GPCC's defaults, United Park 
was entitled to take all of that property back," because it "is a legal question." Id. at 
28-29. But Royal Street represented to the district court that "United Park had the 
opportunity to take back the resort property but refused to do so, insisting that what it 
wanted was to get paid on the contracts it had entered into in 1971." (R. 4133) 
Royal Street does not challenge Bernolfo's statement that United Park's properties 
had increased greatly in value, which cites the internal Robert Wells memorandum dated 
April 19, 1975 valuing United Park's properties. But Royal Street does challenge 
Bernolfo's statement that the Wells memorandum "was apparently prepared for the GPCC 
restructuring discussions," arguing that the "reason a memorandum was 'apparently' 
(continued...) 
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Royal Street presents no basis for striking the affidavits. Those affidavits, 
together with the documentary record that includes the vast majority of facts upon which 
United Park relies, establish significant disputed issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN THE FACE OF UNITED PARK'S RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT WHICH 
DEMONSTRATED UNITED PARK'S NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY. 
Defendants attempt to convince this Court that United Park had sufficient 
opportunity for discovery. Certain defendants suggest that United Park engaged in 
massive discovery over several years, see A&A Br. at 6-7, while others suggest that 
United Park never submitted a single discovery request. See R.S. Br. at 22.6 Defendants 
greatly distort the discovery record in this litigation, which in accurate context 
establishes that initial discovery efforts were focused, by agreement among counsel, on 
the fraud and racketeering allegations in the initial Complaint. Defendants have 
precluded discovery since United Park filed its Amended Complaint in June 1988, and 
United Park has had no opportunity for discovery directed to the issues raised by their 
dispositive motions. 
In May 1986, United Park through its law firm Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, filed 
the initial Complaint which named Royal Street and GPCC as defendants and alleged that 
they defrauded United Park and its controlling shareholders and committed racketeering. 
The initial Complaint was based on facts new management and the law firm had been able 
5(... continued) 
prepared is . . . speculation." Id. at 29. United Park, however, was entitled to that 
reasonable inference on summary judgment. More importantly, Royal Street 's objection 
is a red herring. The memorandum is significant not for the reason it was prepared, but 
because it valued United Park's properties at $37.8 million, including the Deer 
Valley/Lake Flat properties at more than $15 million, when the Proxy Statement told 
United Park's outside shareholders that the property values were unknown. 
6
 Royal Street incorrectly claims it had provided United Park the opportunity to 
inspect boxes of documents which United Park failed to inspect. R.S. Br. at 22. Morgan-
Fidelity also incorrectly claims that United Park did not request documents from Fidelity, 
Royal Street or AMOT. M-F Br. at 18. 
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to learn through investigation, but without the benefit of any discovery. Royal Street 
and GPCC filed motions to dismiss, which were denied by Judge David Dee in December 
1986, The deposition of Clark Wilson, an Anaconda official who had been president and 
a director of United Park, was then begun but not completed. 
In February 1987, United Park retained current counsel, who investigated the 
possibility of pursuing productive settlement discussions before embarking on the 
extensive discovery that would be required. Counsel for Royal Street and GPCC indicated 
that the fraud and racketeering claims made negotiations difficult, and that they believed 
those claims unfounded. Accordingly, counsel agreed to focus discovery on these 
allegations, particularly whether Royal Street or GPCC had misrepresented and concealed 
material information from United Park and its controlling shareholders Anaconda and 
ASARCO during the restructuring of GPCC.7 Pursuant to this understanding, a number of 
depositions were taken and certain documents voluntarily produced, including documents 
obtained from Anaconda and ASARCO by Royal Street 's counsel reflecting their 
knowledge of and participation in the restructuring of GPCC.8 
7
 See R. 7969 at 238-40 (transcript testimony of David K. Watkiss at a hearing on 
the motions of Anaconda and ASARCO to disqualify Watkiss & Campbell from representing 
United Park). Watkiss testified that in early 1987, he had discussions with counsel for 
GPCC and Royal Street about possible settlement negotiations, their claim that their 
clients had not misled United Park's Board concerning the 1975 Resort Agreements, and 
that it was now well known that there had been complaints in 1975 that the Board was 
not protecting the company's interests. ARCO and ASARCO and Royal Street select 
certain words from this testimony about counsel's knowledge of facts in 1987 to 
incorrectly claim that counsel admitted that it was common knowledge in 1975 that the 
United Park Board had not protected the company's interests. See A&A Br. at 49 and 
R.S. Br. at 48. While this testimony may be subject to selective interpretation or 
distortion, the facts are not—Anaconda's and ASARCOfs control of United Park was 
common knowledge in 1975, but their failure to protect United Park's interests was then 
only known to them, their representatives on United Park's Board and the other 
defendants. 
8
 Royal Street well knew that United Park had been controlled by Anaconda and 
ASARCO. Royal Street had negotiated significant portions of the 1971 Resort Agreements 
in the New York offices of Anaconda (R. 7938 at 10-11), and in 1973, Royal Street and 
Morgan-Fidelity had approached Anaconda and ASARCO about the possibility of purchasing 
their controlling interest in United Park. (R. 6623) Royal Street 's counsel, in arguing 
Royal Street 's motion to dismiss the first Complaint, informed the court that Anaconda 
and ASARCO were "the mining companies which controlled United Park at that time." 
(continued...) 
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As a result of the facts learned through this discovery, United Park prepared an 
Amended Complaint which added as defendants Anaconda, ASARCO, AMOT and Morgan-
Fidelity, and asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims instead of the fraud and 
racketeering claims in its initial complaint. Before any responsive pleadings were filed, 
Anaconda and ASARCO moved to disqualify United Park's counsel and obtained a stay of 
all discovery that continued until November, 1989. The order which lifted the stay 
established the briefing schedule for the "dispositive motions11 that defendants filed three 
weeks later. See M-F Br. Add. 9. 
The Affidavit of David K. Watkiss, United Park's counsel, specified United Park's 
needed discovery, including depositions of officials of Anaconda and ASARCO who were 
United Park Board members, Anaconda and ASARCO' officers to whom these Board 
members reported, and Anaconda and ASARCO officers who appeared to have participated 
in critical decisions concerning the 1975 Resort Agreements. (R. 4862-67) Several 
defendants argue that additional discovery would be irrelevant or cumulative, because it 
can only prove that United Park's stockholders and directors knew more about the 1975 
Resort Agreements, but not less. See A&A Br. at 68. That assertion is obviously false, 
because these depositions, together with documentary discovery from ARCO and ASARCO, 
are needed in order to fully respond to the statute of limitation issues and to ARCO and 
ASARCO's claims that they did not control United Park. United Park also needs to 
depose Harold Steele, Wheeler Sears, and perhaps Sears1 counsel, Steven Leshin, in order 
to further establish that these directors could not or would not discover or assert United 
Park's claims. United Park needs to depose Jerome Gartner to determine why he did not 
follow up on his letter to the United Park Board and what John B. M. Place, Chairman 
of Anaconda, said to him. Also needed is the deposition of Tully Friedman of Salomon 
8(...continued) 
(R. 7922 at 24) Even Anaconda was then acknowledging this control. (R. 7930 at 104) 
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Brothers who had studied GPPC's financial condition and had proposed a number of 
alternative solutions to preserve GPCC and protect its shareholders interests. 
Some defendants argue that United Park should have obtained any needed 
discovery after the extended stay was finally lifted during the four-month schedule 
established for filing the extensive memoranda and documents addressing defendants' 
motions and for argument. The impossibility of arranging a schedule with all of the 
defendants for a number of out-of-state depositions and taking these depositions while 
concurrently preparing a detailed 185 page response to defendants' voluminous memoranda 
and appendices and preparing to argue the motions establishes the spuriousness of this 
claim. 
United Park reasonably and timely raised its need for additional discovery when 
it filed its Rule 56(f) affidavit with its opposition to defendants' motions. The district 
court abused its discretion in granting defendants motions before permitting United Park 
adequate discovery. The judgment should be reversed. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 
312-15 (Utah 1984); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193-
94 (Utah 1977). 
III. ANACONDA AND ASARCO CONTROLLED UNITED PARK AND BREACHED THEIR 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO UNITED PARK'S OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS. 
Despite the undisputed evidence in the record, the admissions of an Anaconda 
official, and the testimony of other participants in the 1975 Resort Agreements, Anaconda 
and ASARCO argue repeatedly that United Park "submitted no factual basis" that 
Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park, A&A Br. at 22, and that United Park 
"cannot hold ARCO and ASARCO responsible for the conduct of board members just 
because ARCO and ASARCO caused the directors to be elected." Id. at 59. The district 
court held that "no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding [United Park's] 
allegations against ARCO and ASARCO" (R. 7855,115), even though Anaconda and ASARCO 
did not seek summary judgment that they owed no fiduciary duties to United Park or that 
there were no genuine issues of fact as to whether those duties were breached. To the 
11 
extent that their contentions about control can be now construed to support the district 
court's finding, however, the evidence is as follows. 
Between 1970 and 1985, Anaconda and ASARCO owned 31% of United Park's shares. 
The remaining 69% of United Park's; shares were widely dispersed among more than 5,000 
shareholders (R. 4736-37), which gave Anaconda and ASARCO effective control. 
Anaconda and ASARCO did not, as they would have this Court believe, merely "cause" the 
directors to be elected. Each company elected two of its own employees to United 
Park's seven-member board. Clark Wilson was asked by his superiors at Anaconda to 
become a director of United Park shortly after he became manager of Anaconda's 
operations for Utah, Nevada and California. (R. 7930 at 12-13, 16; R. 7932 at 371) 
Wilson also became United Park's president and supervised its day to day activities from 
his Anaconda office. (R. 7930 at 49; 7944 at 22) Between 1969 and 1981, Wilson 
submitted monthly reports regarding United Park mining and resort activities to his 
superiors that were not provided to anyone outside Anaconda. (R. 7930 at 23) Wilson 
always reported to his superiors at Anaconda, and obtained approval from Anaconda and 
ASARCO before presenting a transaction to United Park's board. Id. at 48-50. 
In late 1974, Anaconda and ASARCO decided to get United Park out of the ski 
resort and land development business, and to protect Park City Ventures, the joint 
venture they had formed to mine United Park's properties.9 Wilson admitted that 
9
 Anaconda and ASARCO formed Park City Ventures in 1970. As United Park's 
controlling shareholders, Anaconda and ASARCO caused United Park to lease to Park 
City Ventures all of its mining property and equipment. Under the lease, Anaconda and 
ASARCO were to receive two-thirds of the net mining profits. (R. 6291-93) Because 
of their holding in Park City Ventures, Anaconda's and ASARCO's interests in United Park 
differed from the interests of United Park's other shareholders. (R. 7954 at 110; 7930 
at 105, 112) With the Park City Ventures Mining Lease and the 1971 Resort Agreements, 
United Park was transformed into a holding company with only an office manager and two 
secretaries. (R. 4744) United Park was wholly dependent on Park City Ventures, operated 
by Anaconda and ASARCO, and on GPCC, operated by Royal Street. Wilson conceded 
that, with respect to United Park's surface assets, the interests of Anaconda and ASARCO 
differed from the interests of United Park's other shareholders. (R. 7930 at 112) 
Anaconda and ASARCO refused to allow United Park to preserve its equity in GPCC or 
its interest in the resort's property and other assets, even though they knew that the 
value of the resort and the real property that United Park had contributed to GPCC had 
(continued...) 
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Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park, and that it was their "policy" to "get out 
of the resort business" because their first interest was mining. (R. 7930 at 104-5) 
Wilson testified that Anaconda was very anxious to protect the mineral property, and 
believed that a threatened bankruptcy of GPCC could have a negative impact on the Park 
City Ventures mining lease. (R. 7932 at 474-76) Anaconda's principal goal was to 
protect the mining lease, and Wilson's first duty to Anaconda was to make sure that 
United Park did not do anything during any restructuring of GPCC that would interfere 
with the mining lease. (R. 7930 at 104-5, 112; 7932 at 473) "[A]nything that we thought 
we could arrive at for the interests Anaconda and ASARCO represented had to be cleared 
in New York." (R. 7932 at 411) 
Other parties to the 1975 Resort Agreements confirmed that Anaconda and ASARCO 
dictated United Park's position. Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative, 
testified that Anaconda and ASARCO "had zero interest in the future of the ski area," 
but were "very, very serious about trying to protect their mining rights." (R. 7954 at 
109-10) Butler testified that their focus was almost exclusively on "mining and the 
protection of the mining interests" and "what they had coming under the old 1971 
agreements." Id. Anaconda and ASARCO did not attempt to obtain anything more than 
that (R. 7954 at 110-11), because "they basically wanted to protect their mine and 
protect their principal." (R. 7954 at 112) Consequently, Morgan-Fidelity "never really 
had any cause to negotiate very much" with Anaconda and ASARCO. Id. Donald Prell, 
Unionamerica's representative, testified that United Park did not want to wind up getting 
back the resort property because they "had the subsurface, the mines that they wanted, 
obviously, to keep." (R. 7921 at 49) The 1975 Resort Agreements were completed in May 
and June 1975 consistent with the position of Anaconda and ASARCO, and the parties then 
9(... continued) 
increased greatly since 1971. In a memorandum to the Anaconda files dated March 26, 
1975, for example, Wilson wrote that the "value of the properties is now much greater 
than in the [1971] UPC contract, perhaps 10 times." (R. 6467) 
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performed many of the terms months before the October 7, 1975 special shareholder 
meeting,10 They did so, of courses because they knew that Anaconda and ASARCO 
controlled United Park and thus treated shareholder approval as a formality. 
These facts establish control even as Anaconda and ASARCO define it in their 
brief. See A&A Br. at 22. Under Delaware law, United Park's place of incorporation, 
shareholders owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders if they affirmatively direct the 
affairs of the corporation or dictate the terms of a corporate transaction. See, e.g., 
Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 1.19, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971) (control implies a "direction 
of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the 
corporation (or persons) doing the controlling"); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa 
Corp., 374 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1977) (controlling shareholder owes fiduciary duty when it 
controls transaction and fixes its terms); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (shareholder owes fiduciary duty if it exercises control over the 
business affairs of a corporation). Despite the pleas of Anaconda and ASARCO to the 
contrary, they unquestionably controlled United Park and directed its position in the 1975 
Resort Agreements. United Park can "hold them responsible for the conduct of board 
members" whom they directed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
United Park has presented compelling evidence that, contrary to the district 
court's findings, United Park could not discover or assert its fiduciary duty claims before 
independent management assumed control in 1985. United Park established that 
defendants concealed and misrepresented material facts from United Park's outside 
10
 In late spring 1975, Royal Street surrendered control and management of GPCC to 
AMOT, which infused $675,000 into GPCC. (R. 7940 at 86; 5940) Anaconda and ASARCO 
caused United Park to make the undisclosed sale of valuable real property in Deer Valley 
to Royal Street at prices well below market value. (R. 4753-54) Unionamerica received 
the property deeds and contract rights even before the Agreements were signed, and sold 
or liquidated some of the property during the summer of 1975. (R. 6626; 4753; 7953 at 
97) 
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shareholders that prevented discovery of the fiduciary duty claims. United Park ("U.P.") 
Br. at 34-44. United Park also established that United Park's outside directors either 
could not assert claims on behalf of United Park, because defendants concealed material 
facts from them, or would not do so, because they were directed and controlled by 
defendants, had conflicts of interest that precluded them from asserting such claims, or 
were implicated in the wrongdoing. U.P. Br. at 44-46. 
Defendants urge this Court to focus on a few selected "facts" and to ignore all 
other facts and inferences to which United Park was entitled. Defendants argue that 
these "facts" establish as a matter of law that United Park's outside shareholders and 
directors had "notice" of United Park's fiduciary duty claims. At the very most these 
facts establish disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. 
Defendants also attempt to impose a legal burden on United Park that has no application 
here, but even if the burden applies, United Park has met it. Finally, several defendants 
reassert the fall-back argument that United Park should have discovered its claims in 
1982, after Wheeler Sears became president of United Park, even though defendants 
abandoned this argument before this district court.11 
11
 Morgan-Fidelity, GPCC and AMOT also argue that the discovery rule does not 
apply to them because there is no evidence that they engaged in concealment. M-F Br. 
at 24-26; GPCC Br. at 33; AMOT Br. at 17. The argument is wrong because the discovery 
rule applies to all breaches of fiduciary duty, whether or not there is concealment. See, 
e.g., Stewart v. K&S Co., Inc., 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979) (where "there is a 
fiduciary relationship, such as between corporate officers and a stockholder, the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until the stockholder discovers, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should discover, that there is a wrong"). United Park and Morgan-
Fidelity were co-shareholders in GPCC. Co-shareholders in a closely held corporation owe 
each other the same duties of loyalty and care that partners owe each other. See U.P. 
Br. at 60 & n. 22. Defendants have never disputed this proposition. Furthermore, if the 
discovery rule applies to all breaches of fiduciary duty, it surely applies to claims for 
aiding and abetting those breaches, whether or not there is any concealment. Any other 
rule would be nonsensical, because it would require United Park to discover the aiding 
and abetting before United Park could reasonably discover the underlying breaches of 
fiduciary duty. In In re Rexplore, Inc. Securities Litigation, 685 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. CaL 
1988), the court rejected "the view that each defendant must independently engage in 
affirmative acts of fraudulent concealment in order for the doctrine of equitable tolling 
to apply to that defendant" because it would "require plaintiffs to engage in a due 
diligence inquiry that they could never reasonably know necessary." The court adopted 
"the view that once the plaintiff has been lulled into inaction by the fraudulent 
(continued...) 
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A. Defendants Misrepresented and Concealed Facts from Shareholders that 
Precluded Discovery of the Fiduciary Duty Claims. 
Defendants argue that United Park's shareholders had knowledge of the fiduciary 
duty claims because the disclosures at the May 27, 1975 annual meeting and September 
2, 1975 Proxy Statement provided an "outline" of the 1975 Resort Agreements, M-F Br. 
at 30, or "disclosed the transactions to the stockholders,, describing what United Park was 
receiving and what United Park was giving up in the transaction." A&A Br. at 43. 
Defendants acknowledge that "[c]ertainly some details were omitted from the proxy 
statement," R.S. Br. at 48, but argue that the "fact that additional details were not 
included in the proxy is irrelevant," A&A Br. at 43. 
Among the "irrelevant details" the Proxy Statement failed to disclose were the 
values of the undeveloped properties that United Park was conveying. Defendants had 
valued the development properties at nearly $37.8 million six months earlier, including 
the Deer Valley and Lake Flat properties alone at more than $15 million. (R. 6529) No 
other "detail" could have been more important to a shareholder's decision to approve the 
agreements. Without any factual support, Anaconda and ASARCO make the incredible 
statement that they could not conceal the value of those properties because they were 
"generally known." A&A Br. at 45. This in no way explains why the Proxy Statement 
affirmatively misrepresented to shareholders that United Park "does not know the current 
market value of these property interests." (R. 6666) 
Equally important, the Proxy Statement concealed or misrepresented other 
"irrelevant details" crucial to an understanding of the fairness of the agreements- The 
Proxy Statement did not disclose the increasing profitability of the ski resort operations, 
or that the ski revenues alone made the resort itself then worth as much as $15 million. 
(R. 4765) It did not disclose the large values of the properties or assets that the other 
n(...continued) 
concealment of one defendant, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all the 
defendants." 685 F. Supp. at 1138. 
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Hi I mi I in i >nal properties in the Deer Valley area for greatly less than thou true wot flu I I i" 
f; 57 ; 6374) The misrepresentation and omissions of these "in elevant details," together 
C : r lpany's income or assets" (R. 6667), were intended to keep I Jnited Park's shareholders 
of the resort business and had no inb'rost in protecting I Jnited Park's interest in the 
resoi I: pi opertie s 1 : miniIiK I<•.ise and wanted nothing to 
interfere with it.' 2 
Defendants argue that the Gartner letter "refutes" any allegation,, of concealment. 
the special meeting were '"'advised that the fairness of the transaction was being 
at 46. But those eighteen shareholders were never shown the letter not told lis specific 
allegations. Those shareholders were told that the letter was a, "crank letter," a "diatribe 
all details,"' (R. 5940) Contrary to defendants1 assei tion, see A&A Mr » ;it 1/, thnso 
shareholders had no "duty" to ask to see the letter , but wei e entitled to rely on I he 
statements of till: mi, *ii fidi iciaries v 'Ill: :i„c ::: • a *d them complete candor 
\.MCO', :.;., A;AR^ » aigu< M.-.t "silence is not enough to to] 1 the statute of 
limitations," but requires "some trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and 
prevent inquiry." A&A Br, at 43. Silence by fiduciaries, however, is an affirmative act, 
because a fiduciary has an affirmative duty to speak. See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. 
Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 1971); Dymm v. Cahill, 730 F. Supp. 
1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), In any event, the discussion at the annual meeting, the preparation 
and dissemination of the misleading Proxy Statement, and the reassurances to shareholders 
before, during and after the special meeting, are all wrongful affirmative acts intended 
to exclude suspicion and, prevent inquiry. 
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Defendants also argue that the Gartner letter, and the letters from a few other 
shareholders, are undisputed evidence that those shareholders had knowledge of the 
fiduciary duty claims. See, e.g., R.S. Br. at 44-46; A&A Br. at 46. But Gartner's 
knowledge cannot be attributed to United Park because the knowledge of a single 
shareholder cannot be imputed to the corporation.13 Neither can Gartner's knowledge be 
attributed to other shareholders, because they are not held to the same standard as a 
New York securities lawyer who conducted "hours of intensive research" in the 
"incomplete set of documents" at the New York Stock Exchange and SEC offices. And 
the fact that a few other shareholders questioned the agreements does not mean that 
they had knowledge of the fiduciary duty claims.14 Defendants argue that these letters 
13
 Anaconda and ASARCO wrongly assert that defendants "do not have to show that 
all stockholders" had knowledge, but only that "one independent stockholder" had 
knowledge. A&A Br. at 46. Morgan-Fidelity correctly state that defendants must prove 
that United Park's "class of shareholders" had knowledge of wrongdoing. M-F. Br. at 27. 
As a general matter, knowledge of all shareholders is imputable to the corporation, but 
knowledge of a single shareholder is not (except for a sole or controlling shareholder). 
See, e.g., White v. FDIC, 122 F.2d 770, 775 (4th Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 316 U.S. 672 
(1942) (knowledge of all stockholders is knowledge of the corporation and triggers the 
statute of limitations, but "knowledge of a single stockholder" would not be imputed to 
the corporation and the right of a single stockholder to seek a remedy would, of itself, 
not set the statute of limitations running); Solomon v. Cedar Acres East, Inc., 317 A.2d 
283, 284 (Pa. 1974) (knowledge of single stockholder with a minority interest cannot be 
imputed to corporation); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F.Supp. 432, 441-2 (N.D. Iowa 1946) 
(statute of limitations does not bar corporate derivative suit even if a particular 
stockholder had knowledge of wrongdoing because the "knowledge or lack of knowledge 
of an individual stockholder not connected with a corporation other than as a stockholder 
is not material in considering the statute of limitations as a bar to the claim of the 
corporation"); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying statute of 
limitations where "shareholders as a class" had knowledge of claims). 
14
 Precisely this argument was rejected in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 
F.Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). The shareholders 
brought a derivative suit in connection with the merger of a parent and its subsidiary 
effected by the controlling shareholder of each corporation. Defendants argued that the 
statute of limitations had expired because the named plaintiffs had "doubts about the 
advisability of the merger, . . . were acquainted with key officers of [the parent 
corporation], and yet failed to make inquiries or protests against the action." 286 
F.Supp. at 813. The plaintiffs, however, argued that their consent was obtained through 
misleading proxy solicitations, and subsequent encouraging letters from management. Id. 
at 812. They also argued that "while they doubted that the merger was good business 
practice, they relied upon [the controlling shareholder's] integrity and the information 
provided them by management," and that they had no reason to suspect fraud until much 
later, ki. The court concluded there was "a genuine issue of fact that could be resolved 
(continued...) 
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if a shareholder falls to inquire, lie or she is chargeable with all facts that an inquiry 
would have revealed. See A& A Br, at 47; R.S. Br. at 42. But the letters show that these 
shai « sholdei s made the inqi lii j 
Contrary to defendants1 assertions, the Gartner letter is not a "rough outline of 
the Amended Complaint. " R S Br at 44. Fol lowing: a detailed description of 1 lie history 
to postpone the special meeting and revise the Proxy Statement, which he asserted was 
misleading and confusing, to set forth the fairness of the 1975 Resort Agreements. (R. 
continuing to misrepresent and conceal material facts about the fairness of the 
Agreements. Defendants did not, as their fiduciary duties required, disclose the value of 
special meeting or revise the Proxy Statement as requested Instead, Anaconda and 
A SARCO kept: their proxies in place and directed the I Jnited Park Board to proceed with 
and reassured the other shareholders that the Agreements were "complex and difficult to 
understand," bi it were in their best interest 
selected facts, a jury woi lid be fully entitled, if not compelled, to conclude that I Jnited 
Park" s shareholders eoi lid not have di scovered the breaches of fiduciary di ity prior to 
Proxy Statement, inch iding the representations that the Agreements were necessary and 
would not affect United Park's Income or assets, reasonably convinced shareholders that 
-*!ontinm 
only at trial," and held that a "decision on this question would require us to make 
difficult judgments on the amount of knowledge available to the plaintiffs and the 
reasonableness of theii conduct. In sue! I circumstances, the summary judgment procedure 
Is inappropriate." Id. 
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defendants were acting in their best interest; (2) that the "irrelevant details" were 
intentionally omitted or misrepresented so that shareholders would believe that the 
Agreements were fair and approve them; (3) that if stakeholders had a duty of inquiry, 
they satisfied that duty by writing letters to United Park's Board of Directors; (4) that 
in response to those inquiries, defendants continued to conceal and misrepresent the terms 
of the Agreements to convince those shareholders the Agreements were fair and in their 
best interest; and (5) that United Park's shareholders reasonably relied on the 
representations of the directors who were their fiduciaries. Not only are the facts 
disputed, they are not even the close call that only juries should make. See Chapman, 
784 P.2d at 1186. 
B. United Park's Outside Directors Could Not or Would Not Discover or Assert 
Claims on Behalf of United Park. 
United Park's "outside" directors could not or would not discover and assert United 
Park's fiduciary duty claims. S.N. Cornwall, Harold Steele, and Miles Romney were 
selected by Anaconda and ASARCO,, (R. 7930 at 32) Anaconda and ASARCO determined 
United Park's position in the restructuring, and Clark Wilson as Anaconda's officer and 
president of United Park took the lead in implementing that position. (R. 7930 at 125; 
and 7921 at 31) Cornwall, Lee Travis (ASARCO's officer), and Lamar Osika participated 
with Wilson in the GPCC restructuring, and Cornwall drafted the 1975 Resort Agreements 
that reflected the position of Anaconda and ASARCO. (R. 7930 at 133-6) The only 
reasonable inference — and an inference to which United Park was fully entitled on 
summary judgment — is that Wilson, Travis, Cornwall and Osika followed the instructions 
of Anaconda and ASARCO. Wilson, Cornwall and Romney clearly acted at the direction 
of Anaconda and ASARCO in connection with the special meeting. They approved the 
misleading Proxy Statement, which Osika helped prepare, and received copies of the 
Gartner letter. Wilson and Cornv/all immediately reported the letter to Anaconda and 
ASARCO in New York. Anaconda and ASARCO directed the United Park Board to proceed 
with the special meeting. Wilson, Cornwall and Romney met with Badami and others at 
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and Cornwall then called Gartner to dissuade him from opposing the Agreements. (R 
5940; 4 759) Romney sent telegrams to Gartner and to other shareholders to dissi lade 
to understand but were in their best interest (R 7252) 
Mnroovei , these three director s I: lad long standing ibi isiness \ r- .ih 
Anaconda <jn<i i\l > AR(X) Romney was a mining consultant. Coi nwall, .. ^n 
Cott law firm,, had served for many years as counsel for both Anaconda and United Park 
and had been selected as a direct or by Annromu, 11'1, 7930 at 32) I nil iiiiiii , I in> 
restructuring, I an Cott acted as counsel I oi . i I I liu k, Royal Street, GPCC and 
Anaconda I larold Steele's bank also had longstanding bi isiness relationships with 
Because they acted on the insti: uctions of Anaconda and ASARCO, and "because of 
their long-standing business relationships with the corporations, United Park's outside 
;» . .. i * *m ..^. i is not imputed to the corporation if the dir ectoi is not 
independent o; t->e eontrolling shareholders. In Borden v. Sinskey; 530 F.2d 478 (3i d Cir. 
tl i.€ stati ite of limitatic ns becai lse tl le sonti oil ling dir sctoi s I lad 
concealed their breaches of fiducial y di ity from si lar el: loldei s ' I he c :>i irt rejected tl le 
directors' argument that the corporation 1 lad knowledge of tl le breaches because one 
. t-coit:. *, . wipt,iti., n . ; , i ;e^ J ; ., ,. . ,. * <i - : he. cu ee!u; pa^Sivelj, 
ratified" the arouisition:- vv i i\.* A*a- -I :!I» %«h\- ,.' < ' A : i>ot<*"n: defendai * in 
court in MicheL->eii \ . I'enney\ . <> iL** * IK- .(,<*•, {• * s:«itnt< ui 
limitations and iclosed I-J impute knowledge of the dii ectors where the "new directors 
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were elected by the controlling . . . group, many of them were lent qualifying shares by 
this group, and none of them were ever independent in any real sense." 135 F.2d at 416 
n.2. 
Defendants argue that United Park's outside directors could have proceeded in the 
courts through a derivative suit. M-F Br. at 36-37. Numerous courts, in the context of 
a derivative suit, have excused a plaintiff's failure to make demand on the board where 
the directors participated in the wrongdoing or ratified the transaction. In deHaas v. 
Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F.Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 
1970), the court excused derivative plaintiffs' failure to make demand on the 
corporation's five-member board, even though three members did not participate in the 
contested transactions and had opposed the controlling shareholders in some instances. 
The court stated that it was "extremely unlikely that the board of directors would have 
taken action in connection with plaintiff's claims," because the three outside directors 
were elected by the controlling shareholders and "had taken only a limited interest in the 
corporation's affairs." Id. at 814. The court concluded that "while it cannot be said 
that the three outside directors were wholly dominated by" the controlling shareholders, 
they "were dependent" on the controlling shareholders for information and did not 
"evidence that they were the kind of active and aggressive majority that would be likely 
to undertake the difficult and demanding task of prosecuting a lawsuit for fraud against 
those who elected them." Id. at 814. See also Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th 
Cir. 1971) (excusing demand where the complaint alleged that a majority of the directors 
"participated, approved of and acquiesced in said transaction and are liable therefor"); 
Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2nd Cir. 1955) (excusing 
demand where directors and controlling shareholders were either antagonistic, adversely 
interested, or involved in the transaction); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973), appeal dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1974), cert, denied sub, nom., 419 U.S. 
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1048 OP74> /excusing demand where complaint allowed dial all directors "participated or 
acquiesced in the IVH»II>(;S alleged and are liable therefor11).15 
Milium Fidelity altempts to minimize these ronf lifts an a matter of fact. Monvm • 
1^ uic lily argues that tloiiiw,"" u/i"; 'IUUM i i |x>• .j11• in when lie '"".ijjfj have received 
information thai his former client might reasonably have assumed (hf1! would withhold 
i.pjii i»f5. l}reKenj .•Jieiii " MI i ii ;if TI quoting Chrisicnsen \. District Coutl, H4*l V.26 
1)94, imn (9th i in. iWWi nut UHIMCII ,HI concerns an attorney's qualification*, to 
represent an adversary oJ a former clicnl Whether f lie attorney learned confidential 
inf on inaf ion from the former client is relevant to whether the ifforoey IMH lopresonl I he 
forme: client's adversary, but iias nuiiiing IO do wim uunwail . aoilit> to protrrl m n.iied 
Park's shareholders or whether he was "independent in any real sensed Mlchelsen v. 
Penney, l.lii I" !M .i( Jlf. n !* Moignn Fidelity argues (till Fii'il Seem My1'. longstanding 
relationships with Anaconda and ASARt V» aie "merely hanking ielationsliips. ' M-V Hi. .it 
I,)1 I'hMl hi exactly the ponif Anaconda and ASARO) were First Securities 
•* .mdinrt iv ' ih,1 d i i,|fsl •)MV»TI'. tnd I , i " ! S r n m i " t ' uH i i f "*i Mom Mrn.Mnnnft 
because AMO'F guaranteed its loan io (iPCll. Harold i'teele therefore would not assort 
United Parkfs claims even if lie knew af)Oiit thorn.11' Finally, Morgan-Fidelity argue that 
15
 The cases upon which defendants principally rely involve directors who were 
elected long after the wrongdoing occurred and were not conceivably implicated. Those 
cases do not find that a director at the time of the wrongdoing, who allegedly 
participated in or ratified the wrongdoing, was independent for purposes of the statute 
of limitations. See, e.g., International Railways of Central America v. United Fruit Co., 
373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967) (three independent directors 
elected to board after wrongdoing occurred); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 
1983) (applying International Railways where make-up of board had changed substantially 
and none of the directors were alleged to be implicated;; Curtis v. Connly, 257 ILS vfi 
(1921) (three new and unimplicated directors had com* on the board after ti<o aJlr-tred 
wrongdoing and had not taken action themselves v :; : h« ^nifaUonc T^n^j 
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 Morgan-Fidelity argues that it is "pure specm.* an tiuii Steeie may nave u~~r 
unaware of the misrepresentations or omissions in the I'.oxy Statement or o\ the CUw - •*! 
letter, M-F Br. at 33, but it is an inference to which l-nitcd Park was fully entitle-. sn 
summary judgment, because Steele did not attend either meeting. It appears that Steeie 
took "only a limited interest in the corporation's affairs," detiaas v. Empire Petroleum 
Co., 286 F. Supp. at 814, and "exercised little if any independent supervision. Farmers 
& Merchants NatM Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1524 (loth Cir. 1990). But if he was 
Kit inued. . . ) 
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there is no evidence that Romney acted on any instructions from Anaconda or ASARCO, 
M-F Br. at 34, but this is squarely contradicted by the facts recited above. Romney 
responded to the Gartner letter, sent telegrams to Gartner and other shareholders and 
proceeded with the special meeting all at the direction of Anaconda and ASARCO. 
Some defendants attempt to inflate the status of LaMar Osika, United Park's 
secretary-treasurer. See e.g., R.S. Br. at 38-41. Royal Street mischaracterizes Osika 
as United Park's "negotiator" during the restructuring, id. at 39, and argues that Osika 
was independent of Anaconda and ASARCO and could have asserted United Park's claims. 
Id. at 41. As Royal Street knows, Clark Wilson took the lead for United Park during the 
restructuring. (R. 7930 at 125) Some of the participants could not even recall Osika. 
(R. 7921 at 166; 7954 at 146-7) Osika was not a director of United Park or a member 
of its executive or management committee (R. 7944 at 14), and "never felt that [he] 
could actually make a decision," but was free to give his "comments and work with the 
directors." Id. at 30. 
Thus, Osika worked for Anaconda's Clark Wilson, his direct supervisor as United 
Park's president, and had no authority to take any action. Osika was beholden to 
Anaconda and ASARCO for his employment, and could not assert United Park's claims 
without jeopardizing his employment. Moreover, to the extent that Osika participated 
in the negotiations or preparation of the Proxy Statement, Osika was implicated in the 
wrongdoing and was not independent for that reason as well. To paint Osika as the 
vigilant bulwark ready to protect United Park's shareholders from wrongdoing is absurd 
and at most presents a question of fact. 
Again, a jury would be entitled, if not compelled, to conclude that United Park's 
outside directors were directed and controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO. They were 
elected by Anaconda and ASARCO, had long-standing business relationships with them, 
16(...continued) 
aware of the misrepresentations or the Gartner letter, Steele too was implicated in the 
wrongdoing. 
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could have been implicated in the wrongdoing. Because a jury could reasonably conclude 
that the outside directors were unable or i inwil ling to protect I Inited Park or its outside 
1990) (discussed infra at 28-29), their knowledge cannot be imputed to I Inited Park. 
C. United Park Has No Burden To "Negate the Possibility" That An Informed 
Director or Shareholder Could I lave Brought Suit, But Even if the Bi n den 
Applies, United Park Met It, 
Some d 
compleli* and ^••lusn<- ' ^nt;^r i«i nnea Park \n -VM >nda a:m ASAK<!0 ana fr> «r , He' 
the "possibilit" ,K"* * .*-.»-.. . , i<h^if!^ -r^r*0* . • .v. ,. ]**<*, ^ 
COrpoi 2 . • • e t i i juu i . . ! . : ,i. ^ ~t oj 
Central America v. United Fruit Co., 373 }*.:'-' -iw- .N ir.), i*ert. denied, /S' O' 
(19fi' ,>l " * -dr: r '\V'»4'-v *\r < ** ».\ • • ne t s alleged and established by 
L.a..,. 
First, defendants1 assertion stanc: :*: summary judgment M-ndei - 'ji * id 
United PT 'M- - - - * - :: » '**~:v~rit u /: *o demor/a:ai- n-".".I'V* J""% a! 
mat/: ,a ,;., j . ' * ' . . , :a. .a- • 
198- i"ruL(Ml ; »• :,.-.• \ iarn 'i- /at* • :x aos* ;!>ilit\' Miai v nl^nn^ci dirortor 
or snarehoider couiu na\< ! --/"/ 
Second, many con* :. . :.. : ,-. /: t j Internationa. Kaiiua^s and instead adopted the 
principle of "adverse doinma! lan ' ! s !-^ M .it \i\< M unsta! <ons is tolled as long as the 
controlling shareholders or directors -• ' w /^-- lorninate a ma j'ority of the boai d, \i 1 lethei 
or not a minor itj of 1:1 le boat: d is i .jepenaen : I: iese coin ts 1: lave "concluded tl i.at the 
adverse domii latioi I i i lie more ac ui ; : i • . _. reflects tl le real ities of suing wrongdoing 
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directors who control a corporation." FDIC v. Howse, 736 F.Supp. 1437, 1442 (S.D. Tex. 
1990).17 
Third, International Railways applies only when a corporation knows about its 
claims, but lacks the ability to sue because defendants control the corporation. The 
burden does not apply where the corporation asserts, ats United Park does, that it could 
not discover its claims as well. In International Railways, the corporation did not dispute 
"that sufficient knowledge of the claims existed long before" its complaint was filed, 373 
F.2d at 412, but argued that it could not bring suit despite its knowledge because United 
Fruit Co. controlled its board. (United Fruit's own shareholders had brought a derivative 
action arising out of the same traasactions in 1949, which resulted in a ruling establishing 
breaches of fiduciary duty in 1957. Id. at 410.) The court held that where a corporation 
seeks to toll the statute of limitations solely because of domination, "once the facts 
giving rise to possible liability are known," the corporation has the burden to establish 
"full, complete and exclusive control" and must "negate the possibility" that an 
independent director or outsider shareholder could have brought suit. Id. at 414 
(emphasis added). The court specifically distinguished decisions in which domination was 
As the court noted in FDIC v. Howse, the International Railways standard "has 
not found support outside the Second and Ninth Circuits," while the "adverse domination" 
principle has gained "widespread support among other courts." 736 F.Supp. at 1441-42. 
The court stated the reason for the adverse domination principle as follows: 
As long as the majority of the board of directors are culpable 
they may continue to operate the association and control it 
in an effort to prevent action from being; taken against them. 
While they retain control they can dominate the non-culpable 
directors and control the most likely sources of information 
and funding necessary to pursue the rights of the association. 
As a result, it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
for the corporation to discover and pursue its rights while the 
wrongdoers retain control. 
Id. at 1442, quoting FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F.Supp. 1184, 1193, n.12 (D. Md. 1984). 
Accord, First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 563-64 (3rd 
Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U. S. 1013 (1980); FDIC v. Paul, 735 F.Supp. 375, 377 (D. 
Utah 1990); FDIC v. Manatt, 723 F.Supp. 99, 105 (E.D. Ark. 1989); FDIC v. Berry, 659 
F.Supp. 1475, (E.D. Tenn. 1987); FDIC v. Bird, 516 F.Supp. 647 (D.P.R. 1981); Allen v. 
Wilderson, 396 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). 
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Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 931 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasizing that International 
Railways involved "special facts" oi "uniqi le facts11 "where there had been a prior 
successfi ll dei i : ativ e action an I thei c < as a si lbstantial rnlor l 
directors11). 
• Vos«>sian v. Peat, Warwick, Mitchell & Co. : ' • ^ • !)t.; j -^  
tniM^t*"' ciapv«; agains' s v-3»n;au-* ,J ,«;. *•' s>e< ause i \^ :e was nc- ^HIMM U! 
n }MP i •*• . . *. j ; - , -• : .I\M»-W -in * fo !i>p]\ International 
that ' <-e shareh(>Ki**rs SJKH!!*; 'lavn tiiscoM1! (*<1 I in wu^n o tn^ h«-* r-u/ empnasizeu at 
*(]<» 'aae^tion « .vtuMi . . ause *-' action] was or ^ ^ n u : s >\t 'u*< disco1. e:*-i a 
evidence irreiiit ihlv demonstrates .*..* nf !f ois;-<** -n I . »UJJ0 t ia\r t i isr ' \ ;x* 
f^-^^a^jppi corKii ^¥ •• *v - ••» ^ -t ,-* viososian applied the ^amc st;i;maid "iat 
ailer^oiv put h*- snarenoM'" , on m*i h t\ and * ^ i hough tin* named
 h>iaiMtst idnnued 
'UfT'^'or.s ^ ^ v 1 ' 1 ' ^ ih^'v- '»•*• - ')iii|!ni{»»: i!;,.' i <^e events w<*?e no: suff ice t<> 
- .a I 
vine, 1H s t a tus M* n: n a t i o n s PM^M-.: .'• • .;u. : i - ^ ia: t M\'iso:iai*\ >- • m 
investor should have known is particularly suited to a jury determination." Id. at 879.18 
The other decisions cited by d 
e.g..,, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 7 . - ; ^d Cir, 1983) (dismissing complaint where 
"well-publicized SEC action" two years earlier had "set forth in considerable detail many 
of the wrongs" and plaintiffs1 "generalized and conclusory allegations of f r r n^ ' ^n t 
concealment do not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)"); Hum - -:a n. 
Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 606 F.Supp. 1348, 1354 (N.D. Ala. ~1985)~~"aff' '. S 3 
F 2d i o i l (11th Cir. 1986) (barring receiver's cause of action on behalf of bankrupt 
coi poratioo, whose shareholders had actual knowledge of claims and filed two separate 
derivative actions five years earlier; court noting that s ta tu te would not i i in if 
shareholders had no knowledge of claims) 
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Fourth, even if International Railways applies, United Park has met that burden. 
In International Railways, the court held that the corporation failed to meet its burden 
because three directors had been elected years after the wrongdoing, and the evidence 
indicated that they might have been "highly responsive" to a stockholder's demand to sue. 
One director had been nominated to the board on a slate opposing the controlling 
shareholders, and the other two directors had aided outside shareholders in another 
lawsuit against the controlling shareholders, 373 F.2d at 414 & n.7. 
In an analogous situation, the Tenth Circuit recently held that a corporation 
satisfied International Railways despite the presence of two outside directors on the 
board. In Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir. 1990), 
defendants sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict that a bank's suit against 
former controlling directors for making imprudent loans was not tolled while the directors 
controlled the bank. Defendants argued that the "existence of two outside directors on 
[the] board of directors negates;, as a matter of law, application of the adverse 
domination theory," but the court found this argument "without merit." 902 F.2d at 1523. 
The court stated that the International Railways inquiry is "inherently fact-specific," and 
explained that a "plaintiff may also demonstrate adverse domination by proving that an 
informed director, though capable of suing, would not do so." Id. The court found that 
plaintiffs introduced "sufficient evidence to withstand defendants' motion for directed 
verdict on the question of the outside directors' ability or willingness to bring suit on 
behalf of the corporation." Id. at 1524. The court baised this finding on testimony that 
the "outside directors exercised little, if any, independent supervision over the lending 
activities of the bank." Id. 
Unlike the directors in International Railways, United Park's outside directors 
unquestionably would not have been "highly responsive" to a demand to sue. Instead they 
actively dissuaded Gartner and a few other shareholders from opposing or questioning 
the Agreements. United Park's directors were affirmatively hostile to any shareholder 
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action, not merely Indifferent or ignorant: as were the oi ^Llllf~::\J^. 
Merchant's Nat'l Bank If the International Railways burdei applies, mere! » ' *rA 
I 
D. Wheeler Sears 1 Tenure as Pres ident of United Park is Fac tua l ly and Legally 
I r re levan t Because Sears 1 Conflict of Interesl Prec luded Discoveiy and 
Assertion of United P a r k ' s Claims. 
Defendants 1 initial summary judgment memoranda a rgued as an a l t e rna t ive t h a t 
United Pari* '.I nilii have discovered and asser ted it*; fiduciary duly claims in 1982 af te r 
Wheeler Sea r s became president I I hilled I'.iil mil i v\w e s e n u i ivc i I < 'mui ron 
Corporat ion replaced Anaconda rep resen ta t ives on United P a r k ' s Board of Director?., At 
on .ill iiirfiuiiiHil, howcvei , di (nidLiii! •; abandoned Hie 1082 d a t e and relied solely on the 
1*171) da t e , (1? /M2IJ al 101) IIHI 'I he d i s lne t uniil""", I IIidling i*l lac! ,i mil eonrliiMnii1. ol 
law make no re fe rence to Wheeler Sears 1 t enure or to the 1982 da t e . 
fin appeal , Mime rli'lendnnli: r e su r rec t Wheelei Sear";1 t enu re as a ground for 
affirming the district court , They base this argument on a l i m i t , com IUMH.V al lulavil IK 
4050-57) in which Sea r s s t a t ed that he performed a "thorough review" of the 1975 Resort 
Agreement .ill i becoming president ol I Imled Pailk and discussed the agreements 
frequently with members of United Paik1" • liooid ol DiiecLoi.'i. bee A&A Mi. .if Ml, I'U l« 
Br, al 37, The facts, however, contradict Sears1 testimony and explain why defendants 
abandoned then relianii on ilMI'im VlH? dah before the court below, 
First, I line is no reference in any ol the Hoaul meeting minutes dm mg Sean,' 
tenure to any review of l lie agreements by Sears oi the Board, oi to any discussion 
a moil (.», Hoard mi'mber, ul I lit f,iiiine,s%. ol Hie aurcemenP; (If I1042 (5i!35) Second, llupft 
Leach, a member ol llie United Paik Itoaid Ihiouj'houl .Searii1 tenure, lestilied by 
affidavit19 that Sears 
The Leach affidavit is the one substantive affidavit that Royal Street does not 
move to strike. Instead, Royal Street argues that the Leach affidavit is "irrelevant," R. 
St. Br. at 25 n.3, presumably because defendants abandoned their reliance on Sears at 
argument below 
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never apprised the United Park Board of Directors or 
Stockholders of any investigation of the 1975 restructuring 
agreements, nor did the Board during Mr. Sears' tenure review 
or consider the fairness or propriety of these 1975 
agreements, whether the agreements could be renegotiated, or 
if there was any legal basis for United Park to challenge the 
agreements. 
(R. 4810) 
Third, and most significant, Sears had a conflict of interest that precluded his 
assertion of claims on behalf of United Park. Throughout his tenure as president and a 
director of United Park, Sears was also president of Cimarron and the owner of nearly 
half of Cimarron's shares. (R. 4050) Sears became president of United Park to effect 
a merger between Cimarron and United Park in which owners of Cimarron shares would 
exchange their shares for United Park shares. (R. 4771-72) If Sears ever reviewed the 
1975 Resort Agreements, he did so on behalf of Cimarron in connection with the proposed 
merger. The purpose was not to assess the fairness of the Agreements to United Park 
vis-a-vis defendants, but to assess the value of United Park's shares vis-a-vis Cimarron's 
shares. Id. 
To accomplish a merger on the best possible terms for Cimarron and himself, Sears 
had every incentive to devalue United Park. Cimarron shares would be worth more 
relative to United Park shares, and Sears would receive more United Park shares for the 
nearly fifty percent of the Cimarron shares that he owned. Sears had absolutely no 
incentive to discover or assert United Park's fiduciary duty claims because the claims 
would decrease the value of Cimarron shares relative to United Park shares. Sears' 
conflict became more acute when some United Park shareholders challenged the proposed 
merger as overstating the value of Cimarron and understating the value of United Park. 
In response to this challenge, Sears had to maintain that United Park was valued 
appropriately. Sears also would not assert claims against Anaconda and ASARCO because 
he needed the support of Anaconda and ASARCO to effect the merger. (R. 4770-75) 
This conflict continued after the merger proposal was defeated because Sears continued 
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ten (puisne the [Kxssibililv ul .i niorj;oi mil I Afiaeoifda .mid A*V\RCO sold thrii shai m in 
1!»»!J (H, 47'M „i""i.l 
The succession,, of management is irrelevant for stati ite of limitation purposes, 
when succenso management1 -M* conflict preclude n rown <nd assertion of corporate 
c _ tu^ :.} A: A - ::w. ncsi \. i c ; nreld, the liquidatoi s of 
International investine, ' . e : L <r - \> rolling officer, Bernard 
CornfH ' ^ aetirs of fiducir; ' " ' i':;;rrr "Hiati<r a-f assets. Cornfeldl lost 
control . . . . : - . . : ! , • duciary duties to the 
shareholders in misappropriated asset * ( *w o^ :: )e- endants asserted th;- H 
action was barred by the statute of limitations because Cornf eld's - , •- could have M 
discovered by Wjjea I In -Second Cucuil lieltl (hat Vesca . knowledge could, h*.-, m. 
imputed to i n , oven though there was no conspiracy or agreement between Cornt'eld 
and Vesco, because Vesco 
could not be expected to bring an action on [the 
shareholders1] behalf when such an action would simply focus 
attention on his own wrongdoing. While the precise extent of 
the turnover in personnel between the Cornfeld and Vesco 
eras is not clear, it is plain that there was no significant 
change in terms of the likelihood of a suit similar to the 
present one being brought. 
619 F.2d at 930 (emphasis added). 
president • - u * aa* ,M«M.. a. .<*. a* .-i^ eiidd U/i miusell -an; imarron'.iat 
depended upon * minimizing the value n a ark v: ^  a v JS "mi'i j , . - . i 
maintaining th- .:.><:!•.-. . • • ,- ; . \ . . :(-< • .* • 
a director •* -*a . ar^ -^ ;a«:*t a- * :aciualJ> and irualK n relevant .* rawa *\i K S 
discovery of v aaims, uhir -. explains why defendants abandoned this argument bcAuv>. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY 
BANGOR PUNTA. 
The Bangor Punta doctrine bars a corporation from asserting claims against former 
shareholders when the current shareholders purchased all or virtually all of the 
corporation's shares from the wrongdoers. The district court misapplied the Bangor 
Punta doctrine to bar United Park's fiduciary duty claims in their entirety (R. 7855 at 
WI3,4) even though only one shareholder, Loeb, purchased 31.1 percent of United Park's 
shares from Anaconda and ASARCO. In supporting the district court's ruling, Anaconda 
and ASARCO misread Bangor Punta, ignore decisions construing the doctrine, and assert 
facts that: are not in evidence and would be irrelevant: anyway. 
Contrary to the assertion of Anaconda and ASARCO, Bangor Punta does not bar 
United Park's claims simply because "Loeb was not a stockholder at the time the alleged 
mismanagement occurred and because Loeb acquired its stock from the alleged 
wrongdoers." A&A Br. at 52. The Supreme Court barred the corporation's claim in 
Bangor Punta because the current shareholders had purchased virtually all of the 
corporation's shares from the wrongdoers. For that reason the Supreme Court found the 
current shareholders the "real party in interest," disregarded the corporate form, and 
barred the corporation's claim. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & 
Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 711-13 (1974), 
Anaconda and ASARCO assert that "[n]o case has suggested that the Bangor Punta 
doctrine is limited to situations where a plaintiff has; purchased all or substantially all 
of the company's stock." A&A Br. at 56. To the contrary, United Park cited three 
decisions in its brief.20 In fact, no court has barred a corporation's claim where former 
20
 In Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W. 1024 (Neb. 1903), the court barred 
a corporation from recovery because all current shareholders purchased from former 
shareholders. Dean Pound explicitly stated that the corporation would be entitled to 
recovery if any current shareholders were shareholders at the time of the wrongdoing, 
because those shareholders would be "entitled to complain of the acts of the defendant 
and of his past mismanagement of the company . . . ." 93 N.W. at 1028. In In re 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Securities and Antitrust Litigation, 387 F. Supp. 906, 911 
(continued...) 
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t - * V , « • . . . - , , • - H i 
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(.•.continued) 
(E.D. Pa. 1974), the com t o*^ i:.r,ii;y held that ». .;;h .>oraL:<... i:> .;..:^;ea LO ICCOU-: "if 
there are minority shareholders who were such at the time of the alleged wrongful 
transaction/' The court added that the "net result" of Bangor Punta is that "no recovery 
can be had by a plaintiff corporation where the beneficiary of a recovery would be a 
corporation which had purchased 99$ of the stock of the plaintiff corporation after the 
alleged wrongful transactions." (emphasis in original) In National Union Elec. Corp. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 498 F.Supp. 991 (E.D, Pa. 1980), the court emphasized that 
Bangor Punta is a "narrow doctrine," id. at 1005, "that cannot be read to bar recovery 
wherever a corporation seeks to recover for Injury suffered before new owners acquired 
its shares," Tri. if 1002. 
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premium for its shares over their value in 1975. (R. 4737) Loeb will not enjoy a 
windfall, because United Park in all probability will not pay any dividend even if it 
recovers on its claims. Id. And their assertion that the Bambergers should be required 
to bring a derivative suit, A&A Br. at 58, is as illogical as the district court's finding 
that the Bambergers would receive a windfall (R. 7855 at 113). Again, the Bambergers 
have been shareholders since 1953, did not purchase any shares from Anaconda and 
ASARCO, and were injured by their wrongdoing, as v/ere United Park's other outside 
shareholders. 
At a minimum, United Park is entitled to a gro rata recovery. Contrary to the 
assertion of Anaconda and ASARCO, the district court did not hold that a pro rata 
recovery would be inappropriate without a "compelling showing why no complaints were 
asserted by those stockholders over all these years." A&A Br. at 57. Such a holding 
would have been a non-sequitur and a redundancy: a non-sequitur because the discovery 
and assertion of a complaint is a statute of limitations issue, not a Bangor Punta issue; 
a redundancy because United Park has established why it could not discover its fiduciary 
duty claims before independent management assumed control of United Park in 1985. 
Finally, Bangor Punta does not bar United Park's claims against the other 
defendants, none of whom sold shares to Loeb. The district court purported to bar 
United Park's claims against all defendants (R. 7855 at 114), even though the sale of 
shares is the factual and equitable predicate for the doctrine. GPCC and AMOT 
acknowledge that they did not seek summary judgment pursuant to Bangor Punta. GPCC 
Br. at 30; AMOT Br. at 14-15. Bangor Punta clearly does not bar United Park's claims 
against the non-selling defendants; for the reasons stated in United Park's brief. See 
U.P. Br. at 57. 
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VI u N i T E D PARK HAS ESTAiuJSUED THAT AMO'I ' AND GPCC AIDED AND 
ABETTED THE BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY ANACONDA, ASARCO, 
MORGAN FIDELITY AND R(M -M STREET. 
Liability for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty requires proof of a 
f... 
iu direct fiduciary relationship, ... -.linages resulting ; .. im M O ^ . .><-O, <-.£. 
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., :>S9 Jr i* .w ; ^1. ; J 8 9 \ Gilbert v. El 
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liability"). AMOT and GPCC each argue, for different reasons, that United Park failed 
!" establish that either aided and abetted the breaches of f idurian • / ^ vw n-\or 
• . • ; < . . - : „ Neithei defendant escapes liabil itj h ::: a e\ ei 
participated in the breach. 
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investment in a failing ski resort," AMOT Br. at 30, is totally false. AMOT acquired a 
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ski resort which then accounted for one-third of Utah's ski-rental and valuable property 
interests worth many times its small investment. (R. 4754; 4765) 
These facts establish AMOT's aiding and abetting liability. When corporate 
representatives breach their fiduciary duties by failing to protect corporate interests or 
preferring themselves in a corporate transaction, the other party aids and abets that 
breach by consummating the transaction with knowledge of the breach. In Penn Mart 
Realty Co. v. Becker, a corporation's shareholders sued its directors for breach of 
fiduciary duty because the directors sold corporate assets for less than their value. The 
court held that the shareholders stated an aiding and abetting claim against the 
purchaser because it completed the purchase knowing the true value of the assets. The 
court stated that plaintiffs 
argue that the [directors] were grossly negligent, wasted 
corporate assets, and therefore breached their fiduciary duty, 
by selling a corporate asset . . . to [defendants] at a price 
greatly less than they knew, and had in fact determined, to 
be its true worth. [Defendants] knew that they were dealing 
with fiduciaries, knew the true worth of the asset through 
their inside information, and nevertheless aided the directors 
in the breach of their duties . . . The legal theory is sound. 
The directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship 
to a corporation's shareholders. And one who knowingly joins 
with any fiduciary in a breach of his obligation is liable to the 
beneficiaries of the trust relationship. 
298 A.2d at 351 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Gilbert v. El Paso Co., El Paso's directors breached their fiduciary 
duties by structuring El Paso's response to Burlington's friendly tender offer so that the 
directors tendered their shares to Burlington, thereby denying other shareholders the 
opportunity to tender their shares. The court held that Burlington aided and abetted the 
breach by purchasing the shares with the "presumed knowledge of El Paso's fiduciary 
duty to protect the interest of the! shareholders": 
Clearly, the purchase of approximately 556,000 shares from El 
Paso's directors falls within the gambit of a claim of civil 
conspiracy. By agreeing to purchase them from El Paso's 
directors, Burlington is chargeable with knowledge that El 
Paso's directors were preferring their interests to certain of 
its shareholders who had already tendered. . . . To the extent 
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those shareholders suffered damages, an issue not contested 
by Burlington in context of its motion for summary judgment, 
the elements of a civil conspiracy appeal complete. 
490 A.2d a t 1057.21 
Both IVv.n :v1.i. 'i . i!J^ <* • MV'^P"1 ' I T *»rr*:mont ' h i t AMOT makes 1 .hat 
AMC xs u. .;,••* < v negotiating M a^h;, a,:.,;:;. .uia pursuu r i . t possible ter nis f c i its 
own shareholders. . iv <>i n Penn Mart s tated that liability does not require proof 
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not at arms-length. 2\)b . . . * : . , - *: ' * ":ie corpora - -:.: . to 
obtain the best price for its shareholders did not relieve it from the "duty to i efrain 
from par ticipating in another 's breach of fiduciary di itj " I d at 352, And in Gilbert the 
court emphasized that: Bui lington's clut} to its shai ehoiders to obtain the best price for 
El Paso fs shares 
does not necess.:.:i> •/( • iu.« uic OIICJ-,: \ 1UI3 to refrain from 
participating in the target management's breach of fiduciary 
duty. Thus, although an offeror may at tempt to obtain the 
lowest possible price for stock through arm's-length 
negotiations with the ta rge t ' s board, it may not knowingly 
part icipate in the target board's breach of fiduciary duty by 
extracting terms which require the opposite party to prefer 
its interests at the expense of its shareholders. 
4 - \. 
AMOT's aiding and abetting 1 iabilitj , however, does not rest solely on its knowing 
participation in the breach because Nicholas Badarni, A MO' r ' s president, attended the 
share^oiw.*:^ addition - •» comments disparaging . ;^ - (laitnei irt xex A> .. 'iij.sjiino 
of misfacts," Badami HA^r « lengthy speech urging the shareholders to approve the 
*-;: <* * »i: - ;:" tl: ie disasti 01 is conseqi lences if tl ley :il ::l 1: 1 Jt • :i :: sc 
witho ;• oeia>, J941-42) 
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 f "civil conspiracy" and "aiding and abetting" ai e 
interchangeable. See, e.gM Weinberger v. Rio Grande Industries, Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 13! 
(Del. Ch. 1986) 
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Badami began by telling the shareholders that "timing is probably the essence of 
the whole [ski] business" and that AMOT had assumed control of the ski resort in May 
because "the ski season is made or broken from May to opening day." Badami told the 
shareholders that when he heard about the Gartner letter, "we were quite upset because 
an adjournment of this meeting was something we had not counted on under any 
circumstance." Badami then described his experience as a businessman and a ski resort 
operator, concluding that "I really, from a business decision, can't see how the Mining 
Company could have made any other decision than the one they made to insure the 
continuity of the resort." (R. 5941-42) Badami emphasized that if the resort fails to 
open on time, it is "a very difficult thing to start up again." Badami asserted that the 
United Park's rights under the Resort Agreements "would probably become meaningless 
as far as the bottom land was concerned and the lease on the ski rights, of course, would 
be in the same position. So that I feel that an adjournment of this decision would be 
disastrous because we are geared up to get this operation open to the public as soon as 
we have snowfall." Just before he disparaged the Gartner letter, Badami told the 
shareholders that the 1975 Resort. Agreements were a "good decision from a business 
standpoint" and that the "decision now should be to proceed." Id. 
AMOT attempts to characterize Badami's speech as a "difference of opinion 
between him and Gartner," and asserts that United Park's "shareholders were free to 
choose between the two views." AMOT Br. at 27. AMOT also asserts that United 
Park's shareholders did not "rely" on Badami's statements because "sufficient shares to 
approve the transactions had already been voted by proxy prior to the meeting." Id. But 
Badami's speech was intended not only to solicit votes for approval, but to insure that 
the shareholders did not demand adjournment, take any action opposing the agreements, 
or do anything that required full disclosure of Badami's great corporate opportunity. 
AMOT also asserts that "there was no basis" for United Park's shareholders to 
"rely on Badami" because he "obviously was acting on behalf of his own shareholders," 
38 
and '[t]her e v as no i eason" tc p i it mor- • * - m mai "n*"* ' ^ r V- !< ^ f" -*« 
27-28, No s ta tement coi ild b€ • nioi e d L . ^ ^ i; .. ..• * v.- was ,\ : . --. 
convince? United Pa rk ' s shareholders h u ' *<very right -o teh on Badarni because in lold 
them tha t he had si ipei ioi knowledge based on his experience in the ski industry arid his 
four months" in control of GPCC. Badami described Ins expedience beraust" he w anted 
United Park1* shareholders < ' - opinion, Badami told I Jail ed I "ai k ' s 
shai el lolders 1 l ^ .' *'-Med a disast-" "< " * 'holders ad journed the 
meeting or qu«** .oin J ;.,< tairness ui ,i\o restructure,-., ivieirner he nor AMO I 
tried to explain why tl ie resort could ••* -."v opontM* ovo • •in*- • h ireholder voir had 
bern I mil iiiniMiill in in i in (in I til jitional facts •" " V i -.*soi' :*• xmrse is **v* the 
resoi t w as i: eady and "« "Oi i l d h a v e > - - .. ,. -,.. , >.. i . .-.* : . - I V P 
demonstrated the unfairness of tl ie Agreements an<: jeopardizes i .- g.*"«' corporate 
oppoi f:i; inity 
Finally, AMOT asserts that it was not a "substantial factor " because Anaconda and 
ASARCO oo;,] "! , ave breached their fiduciary duties "with or without AMO I " Id. a t 30. 
T - » ' - . -
 n t to tl i€ • ::li ivei of the getaway car asser ting tl lat he did not aid and 
abet 'fiMiiM1 - -:iieone else w ould 1 lave driven. AMO r tin: ough Badami urged I Jnited 
Park ' s shareholders to approve the Agreements, knowing tl lat they were unfair (R. 
47H1I Those fart '; t>slaWisli m i n i ' s iuibiliii v.22 
— A M O T also makes a fr ivolous argument that I Jnited Par k fails to plead aiding and 
abet t ing with the par t icular i ty required by Utah R. Civ; P. 9(b). AMOT Br. a t 22-24. 
Even if Rule 9(b) applies to allegations of aiding and abet t ing breaches of fiduciary duty, 
the Amended Complaint satisfies the Rule 's "time, place, and manner" requirements. 
Paragraphs 61 , 71-74, and 90-99 of the Amended Complaint alleges t ha t AMOT knew ARCO 
and ASARCO had breached their fiduciary duties to United Park, and alleges the 
substantive ac t s committed by AMOT to aid and abet the breaches . (R. 2789-90, 2800-
01 , 2806-10) Other paragraphs specify the terms of the agreement that were unfair, and 
the misrepresentat ions, omissions, and other ac t s undertaken that precluded discovery of 
the breaches of fiduciary duty. Rule 9(b) is intended to give the defendant "fair notice 
of what the plaint i f f ' s claim is and the grounds upon which it res ts ." Ross v. A. H. 
Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 1979), cer t , denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). The 
"key to any Rule 9(b) motion is whether the complaint can apprise the defendant of the 
alleged conduct with enough detail to enable the defendant to prepare a defense." 
Feinman v. Schulman Berlin & Davis, 677 F Si ipp 168, ] 72 (S.D.N Y. 1988). United 
(continued...) 
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B. GPCC Knowingly Participated in the Breaches of Fiduciary Duty. 
GPCC also argues that United Park has no aiding and abetting claim against it. 
Significantly, GPCC does not challenge any of the facts establishing aiding and abetting 
liability. GPCC knew the undisclosed terms of the Agreements and the true value of 
United Park's development properties and water rights, and Park City's great skiing 
potential. See U.P. Br. at 61. GPCC refused to take other available steps to solve its 
financial difficulties because Royal Street, GPCC's manager, wanted to retain all 
development properties for itself. GPCC defaulted on its obligations to United Park, but 
not to other land owners, at the same time it was acquiring additional properties (R. 
4782). 
Instead, GPCC draws a distinction between "old" GPCC, in which United Park, 
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity owned shares, and "new" GPCC, which AMOT purchased 
through the 1975 Resort Agreements. GPCC argues that Royal Street and Morgan-
Fidelity committed the wrongdoing, not GPCC itself. GPCC Br. at 34-35. GPCC cites 
no authority for this proposition, but relies on United Park's assertion that co-
shareholders in a close corporation owe each other the same fiduciary duties that 
partners owe each other. Id. But the fact that Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity owe 
fiduciary duties to United Park hets nothing to do with GPCC's liability. GPCC is a 
corporation with an independent existence. It had officers and employees (including, for 
example, Robert Wells and Harold Taylor), who were not employees of Royal Street or 
Morgan-Fidelity. By asserting that: its shareholders, Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity, 
committed the wrongdoing, GPCC in effect demands that its corporate veil be pierced. 
Such a demand is nonsensical on these facts. The corporate veil doctrine protects an 
injured party when wrongdoers assert corporate formalities as a defense to liability; the 
(...continued) 
Park's Amended Complaint not only enabled AMOT to prepare a defense, AMOT has done 
so. 
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effective23—the Agreements were "procedurally unconscionable". See Resource 
Management, 706 P.2d at 1042; U.P. Br. at 64-65. At the very least, that evidence 
created an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. United Park also presented 
substantial evidence that the 1975 Resort Agreements as a whole, and in particular, the 
Water Agreement and the Ski Lease extensions, were substantively unconscionable. See 
Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041-42; U.P. Br. at 19-23, 65-66. Defendants 
presented no evidence to the district court, and there is none in the record, 
demonstrating that the Agreements were fair to United Park. 
The district court made no finding that the 1975 Resort Agreements were not 
unconscionable. Rather, it dismissed, as a matter of law, United Park's prayer for 
reformation on essentially two grounds: (1) as to the claim against Royal Street, estoppel 
based on the Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates; and (2) as to the claims against Royal 
Street, GPCC and Morgan-Fidelity, waiver or estoppel based on United Park's acceptance 
of payments under the Agreements;.24 This was error. 
A. The Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates Do Not Bar United Park's Prayer for 
Reformation Against Royal Street. 
1. United Park is not estopped from seeking reformation. 
Wells Fargo argues that United Park is estopped from seeking reformation of the 
Deer Valley Lease by the Estoppel Certificates ("Certificates") it executed in 1981 and 
1982 pursuant to Wells Fargo's extension of credit to Royal Street. Wells Fargo1 s 
23
 GPCC's contention that the 1975 Resort Agreements were "heavily negotiated by 
sophisticated businessmen with competent counsel," GPCC Br. at 38, while true as to the 
defendants, but not as to United Park (R. 7954 at 147), is nonetheless irrelevant for 
purposes of the issue of procedural unconscionability. The "sophisticated businessmen" 
purportedly on United Park's side of the negotiations were fiduciaries who did what they 
were told to do by Anaconda and ASARCO and then misled the United Park shareholders. 
But it was the shareholders who had to approve the Agreements, it was the shareholders 
who were misled and it was the shareholders who were coerced into a hasty vote on a 
transaction that their fiduciaries did not fully disclose with the excuse that it was "very 
complex and difficult to understand." (R. 7252) 
24
 The district court also dismissed all of United Park's claims attacking the 1975 
Resort Agreements on statute of limitations grounds. That was error for the reasons 
stated above. 
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Ins, Co. v. Zions First Nat. Bank, «»4« J'-.^J *;><>* : * *" s.eie v< * th«» .\airn 
of a party against whon -: esfoppe : :**.seited is oarree ,
 ? - { ;:M; U . IS 
inconsistent < • • -** -^ 
The represent at i^ns ^'IM'M United Pai ^ - ,. •. \ly o:> oppt ,:•• iv arp: 
[T]he Deer Valley Lease is piescntly in full fo *v an<: -'tfect and has not 
heretofore been amended or modified except as hereinabove specif leal ly described 
and has not heretofore been terminated or cancelled. 
To the best of the knowledge of UPC: (a) No party to said Deer Valley 
Lease is presently in default in compliance with any of the provisions thereof; and 
(b) No event has occurred or circumstance exists which constitutes such a default 
under the Deer Valley Lease or with the giving of notice or passage of time, or 
both, would constitute a default under said Deer Valley Lease. 
(R. 4474; 4483) 
At best, (hese Certificates estop United Park from claiming that defaults existed 
undei (li«l Ueeii \ .illr^ I,<MM' .I. UI I tl\l I inwrvei , I lit* lan^ua^e ml the ( "e? I if ir.ites 
cannot bar United Park's claims foi btear.h of fiduciary duty; nor reformatio of 
contract, because these claims do null allege or rely on defaults under the . w i \ >.lev 
Lease. Instead Utey ai ise llnnii Ihr defendants' biea< lies of I idiiriar) i - ...; 
the 197!,"! Resort Agreements, 
United P'"** •*•» * enrosPM • 'AHls ^argo ir 1981 and 1981' • \ • ould never 
bring any cla i .e '• ••s- 11 miy 
r e p r e s e n t e d tha t t o \\->* f>r*s: «*; \\ u i o w i e d g e no pe. :v *<« no Pn-< Vai ie \ Lease was 
p re sen t I v m de fau l t n<v u . r . Uni ted PaiL n n r e n f l y a w a r e of any e v e n t s which A ould 
const i tute* a de fau l t Itiuiei HIM I ieni < duoy I fMse I mi m r i Vi i| tfiMMleS 
bar I Jnited Park fi on i bringing any claims which affect the n-et valley Lease, regardless 
of tl: te basis of 1: - • ! • •. MI UI lwarranted extension of the language contained 
1:3 
in the Certificates. 
Furthermore, the question of estoppel should not be determined on summary 
judgment. Issues of waiver and estoppel are questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact 
and law, which should be resolved by the trier of fact. American Falls Canal Securities 
Co. v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n., 775 P.2d 412, 415 (Utah 1989). Estoppel is a 
question of law only where the facts and circumstances are admitted or where only one 
inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.25 Id. In this case, both the facts 
are disputed, and more than one inference may be drawn from the evidence. The district 
court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, the language of he Certificates bars 
United Park's claim for reformation. 
2. United Park has not waived its claim for reformation. 
Wells Fargo also argues that the language of the Certificates together with United 
Park's acknowledgment in the Consent and Agreements26 that Wells Fargo could succeed 
to the rights of Royal Street under the Deer Valley Lease imply the validity of the Lease 
and amount to a knowing waiver of any subsequent claim against the leasehold, including 
reformation. Again, at best, both documents support only a waiver with respect to 
United Park's claim for underpayment of lease rentals prior to 1982. 
^Contrary to Wells Fargo's assertion, there are significant fact issues remaining. 
For example, Wells Fargo has provided no evidence that its security would be impaired 
by reformation of the Deer Valley Lease to cancel the additional two twenty year 
extensions granted by the 1975 Agreements. Even if United Park is granted the 
reformation remedy it seeks, termination of the Deer Valley Lease will not take place 
until twenty years hence, and Wells Fargo will likely have received repayment of its 
loans. Wells Fargo makes unsubstantiated arguments regarding how termination of the 
Lease in the year 2011 will have a present detrimental effect on its security (Wells Fargo 
Br. at 20-22), but no facts have been established to support this contention. Wells Fargo 
has also raised the Line of Credit which it provided to Deer Valley in connection with its 
claims of estoppel and waiver, when in fact United Park made no representations in 
connection with the Line of Credit transaction. These factual questions, crucial to a 
determination of estoppel and waiver, are precisely the reason these issues should not be 
determined as a matter of law. American Falls, 775 P.2d at 415. 
26United Park executed Consent and Agreement papers along with the Certificates in 
both 1981 and 1982. (R. 4476-80; 4486-90) 
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to constitute waiver is inconsistent with any otl u -i '• it ent, Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226, 1230 (I Itah App. 1988), The langi lage in " " 'ertificates does not support an 
implied waivi: i: of United Park 's i ic;hl to iteforinr; lie reasons stated dhwi with 
respect to estoppel. Piggly Wiggly oi M.aisfi* id, nic V. Wolpert A s s o c * >o Id 371 
(La- App 1988) does not support Wells K-.-gof airument tha! United l\\r~ -i i >; seek 
refoi: mat ion I " I'igg!>' Wl&lJ1^ 1 l l r l>l«>'iil iff b: • '• ' ise, 
aftei having represented that there "were no default.- Ho , - n\u<^ ruin > fiduciary 
claims and prayer for reformation do not arise oi it of a default i inder *•* ease, but 
rat I: iei f t: oiii br eai :i:lies of fidi iciary di il j o c a u i ing di n ing neu --ion • ' ;or1 
Agreements, 
United Park 's ev>en D P •• . rnnsent and Atrreemen; i>. ;•••
 :;i irpii^fi w ever 
c 
A' minimum, these questions snotmi ao; M\- : decided as a matter of law. 
American Kali.**. "?5 P.2d a1 . V W - T
 ]V w • • • i- determined as a matter of law" w here 
B ^r\\ ;ne of Estoppel by Silence Doe- \ o t liar I Inited Park 's Prayer for 
, * »- -~ M'nst Royal St reet . 
Wells Fargo also argues that I Inited Park is est -pped r n:\ see' : ;g refo* mati^: of 
the Water Agreement under the doctrine of estoppel --v silence heeaas<* if d*<* *•* i -ise 
or at any time prior to the filing of its original Complaint rhe estoppel by silence 
doctrine does not apply here For silence to work an estoppel, "there nn ist be a legal 
another to place himself in ai i i mfavorable position by reason thereof '""" First Inv. 
( o . _v :j^ndersei fc- . '• M83, fi8? C11!*^ 1080?, me mg I *« ih S ta te Bldg.j \nuu.. . v. 
Great American Indent wo.. -i:\ and I* ench v. Johnson, : : ?d 
315 (t Itah 1965) Nenae: e ^ im-n
 ;.^  present here. 
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A legal duty to speak does not arise unless the party against whom the estoppel 
is urged knew or should have known that the failure to speak will likely mislead the 
other party to act to his or her detriment.*7 Wells Fctrgo has provided no evidence to 
support a duty to speak, or to show that United Park knew, or had reason to know that 
Wells Fargo was relying on United Park's silence as an .assurance that United Park would 
never assert an adverse claim of any type under the 1975 Resort Agreements. Indeed, 
such an assertion is simply inconsistent with the specific statements in the Certificates, 
which are limited to issues of default under the Deer Valley Lease (R 4473-74; 4482-84). 
Furthermore, Wells Fargo has presented no evidence that United Park's silence was 
willful or culpable. 
Estoppel is not a favored doctrine, and may be sustained only upon a showing of 
clear and convincing evidence. Berglund and Berglund, Inc. v. Contributions Bureau, 784 
P.2d 933 (Mont. 1990). Wells Fargo has not met its heavy burden.28 
27
 In Knapp v. Daily, 772 P.2d 1363 (Or. App. 1989), for example, the plaintiff began 
replacing a fence that separated his property from defendant, placing the new fence 
directly on the property line. The old fence meandered back and forth across the straight 
property line described in the deeds to the two parcels. When defendant discovered the 
construction of the new fence, plaintiff informed him that he intended to bill defendant 
for one-half of the cost of the fence. Defendant had little comment and did not protest 
plaintiff's plan. The court held that defendant's silence did not work an estoppel, because 
plaintiff presented no evidence that defendant was aware his failure to object would 
mislead the plaintiff. Id. at 136(5. See also McCallister v. Lusk, 693 P.2d 575 (N.M. 
1984) (doctrine of estoppel by silence did not apply because buyers provided no evidence 
that sellers knew that either buyers or buyers' successors in interest were relying on 
sellers' silence as a basis for using escrow company to meet their payment obligations 
under the real estate contract). 
28
 Wells Fargo argues that its security under the 1981 and 1982 mortgages will be 
impaired by reformation of United Park's mining reservation in the Water Agreement, 
Wells Fargo Br. at 21-22, but in fact, none of the water rights subject to United Park's 
mining reservation and therefore its reformation claim are subject to Wells Fargo's 
mortgage. The 1981 and 1982 mortgages have a security interest only in those water 
rights which are appurtenant to the properties covered by the mortgage. (R. 1569; 1612; 
1651; 1721) United Park's reservation applies only to Group II water. Because none of 
the Group II water claims were claimed for use upon or for the benefit of the mortgaged 
land, these water rights are not appurtenant to the mortgaged land. (R. 4824) 
Therefore, the 1981 and 1982 mortgages give Wells Fargo no security interest in any of 
the water subject to United Park's reformation claim. 
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C. United Park fs Acceptance of I 'ayments Under the Water Agreement and the 
Ski Leases Does Not Bar United Park 's Prayer for Reformation of Those 
Agreements. 
Defendants argue and tl le district court apparently be! ieved that because United 
or is otherwise somehow barred from seeking refoimation of the terms of United Park 's 
reser vation i mdei 1:1 ie Wat .ei A g;r ^ ' ":vf * - •• :wo extensions of the Ski 
Leases from 2011 to 2051, and ft) f.: -vise tei,;.», ...lymem , (R. 7834- 36 a t 111157 58, 
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parties ourim: . nendenc*. ri i ! - . iitiuatioiu I'liKo-' Park (ias repeatedh made •-i^ar 
t - , • « •- I 
constitute a W (W\H U' ^mt*;a Fai i\ .• 1'i.iaii.s. ;><--, ^ ieiujui - 1 >*>•* . * >KL 
partial p^Hr- n* .-n*<> f*\ defendants- und«s: tin- SI*; Leases bv paying aii]\:*t • ent a-, it 
c -- - ' .*. x.wu;ane 
Manor, inc. v. Stokermatic, Inc., iv.i* i-.Jd 86t> uJtan . J/9) (.ease ieionm-,i * >t*i though 
defendants ha-i - \ ir t i i !^ w-formed h\ P -\ I;H> UMI' for approximate * toir v«*arsw ^ee 
Gabiick v_._ v^. . . « ' • •: - ' 
reformation). 
p " - : • • - 'Mr 0;u.->' \rf<s^ni"Mi' und'M* \unt- i)\r t :?i^l payment wa^ u.;u,»- In 
J .. • i 
reservation. Keiormatton \> available <n<Mi ihuugi, ;h ^u ix jga::^-' uni>"« LS s l i gh t 
ha^ - h !)e»f --• i obligations \ n idei tl ie c o n f a b Hot ringer \ Jensei r>M I '" .2d 
1 > a\ ailable even, thou * < . \*rn \ • d) 
Waiver requires a dear and convincing showing of an intentional relinquishment 
of a known rig!:?. See B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 
P.2d 99, , r t l f *V "'988). 
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However in this case, the Water Agreement has not been fully performed because United 
Park has continuing rights under it. As is clear from Paragraph 1 of the Water 
Agreement (R. 5088-89) and from the Conveyance of Water Rights (Addendum B), United 
Park's perpetual reservation of Group II water survives and continues after payment of 
the purchase price.30 Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1988) (reservation 
creates or reserves to grantor some right, interest or profit relationship to the estate 
granted). In fact, United Park continues to use Group II water to perform mine 
maintenance, (R. 4825) as is its right under the reservation. GPCC's suggestion that 
United Park has lost its reservation, GPCC Br. at 43, is unsupported and is directly 
contrary to the water conveyance/'11 
Finally, GPCC's claim that United Park has somehow waived its claim for 
reformation of the Water Agreement by releasing title to the water is ludicrous. United 
Park released title pursuant to the lower court's order, which is the subject of this 
appeal* The release of title to the water does not affect the validity of United Park's 
perpetual reservation which is incorporated in the conveyance of water rights. 
After describing the water and water rights sold to defendants, the Conveyance 
expressly states: 
Excepting and reserving unto Grantor [United Park] the prior right 
to use, or to lease or grant to others the right to use, for mining, milling 
and related purposes, the first twenty-eight hundred and fifty (2,850) 
gallons per minute from the aggregate water yield of the water and water 
rights identified and described in Group II above. 
Grantor covenants and agrees that it will hereafter execute, without 
warranty, and deliver to Grantee [GPCC] such further instruments of 
assignment or conveyance, or furnish such other instruments from its records 
as it may possess and which may be required by the State Engineer of Utah 
to complete transfer of the water and water rights hereinabove identified 
from Grantor to Grantee, subject always, however, to the exception and 
reservation to Grantor, its lessees and assigns, of the water and water 
rights as herein set forth. (Emphasis added) 
31
 Because GPCC did not raise and the district court did not address any issue 
regarding the viability of United Park's reservation under the Water Agreement, that 
issue is not before this Court or relevant to this appeal. 
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Thus, because United Park has continuing rights and GPCC and Royal Street have 
continuing duties under the Water Agreement,32 GPCC's argument, unsupported by any 
case authority, that a fully performed contract cannot be reformed is irrelevant to this 
case. Moreover, it is legally wrong. Under the doctrine of unconscionability, the court 
can construe a contract ~ here the Water Agreement's reservation — to avoid an 
unconscionable result even if the other parties to the contract have fully performed. 
See, e.g., Jensen v. Southwestern States Management Co., 629 P.2d 752 (Kan. App. 1981) 
(court reformed 55-year old mineral deeds which contained unconscionable provision). 
United Park presented substantial evidence that the Water Agreement's reserva-
tion must be reformed to avoid an unconscionable result. (R. 4762-63) Due to the 
breaches of fiduciary duty by Anaconda, ASARCO, Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity, 
United Park sold water worth more than $2 million for a present value payment of 
$350,000. (R. 7941 at 215; 4762-63; 4843-45) The volume of water sold was much 
greater than either GPCC or Royal Street needed as is clear from the fact that all of 
the Group II water is subject to United Park's prior, perpetual mining reservation. Due 
to Anaconda's and ASARCO's breach of fiduciary duty, the reservation was not expanded 
beyond mining, milling and related purposes in 1975 even though United Park was giving 
up its equity position in GPCC and GPCC and Royal Street did not need the Group II 
water.33 This left United Park without water to develop its surface properties and 
As explained more fully below, the continuing viability of United Park's reservation 
means that Royal Street and GPCC have continuing duties to take no action to prejudice 
that reservation and are required to treat the water. 
Royal Street acquired one-half of the Group II water for its land development 
projects, leaving one-half with GPCC even though GPCC was no longer involved in land 
development and allegedly did not consider the water valuable. (R. 7941 at 202-04) 
GPCC argues that United Park's inability to use the mining reservation water for mining 
was totally foreseeable in 1975 because neither United Park nor Park City Ventures had 
been able to show a profit from mining operations. GPCC Br. at 40. If this was 
foreseeable, then Anaconda and ASARCO's fiduciary derelictions were even more 
egregious. However, GPCC misrepresents its cited source, which reports that Park City 
Ventures had been engaged in development and not full scale production before May 1975 
(continued...) 
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wholly dependent on mining operations controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO. The 
unconscionability of the Water Agreement, as GPCC would have it construed, is further 
underscored by GPCC's position that United Park must pay the very substantial annual 
water treatment costs for Group II water from the Ontario Tunnel, but cannot use that 
reserved water for development purposes while GPCC claims it does not use or need the 
water. Such a construction of the Water Agreement is substantively unconscionable 
because the terms are "so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party"; 
they reflect "an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain"; 
and they reflect a "significant cost-price disparity." Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 
1041-42. 
The unconscionability of the Ski Lease rental payments to United Park and the 
lease extensions is also readily apparent. United Park receives annually approximately 
$60,000 from Morgan-Fidelity for the lease of nearly 6,000 acres, while Morgan-Fidelity 
nets some $1 million annually under its sublease to GPCC of the same property. (R. 
4768-70) Thus, United Park only receives about $10 per acre per year for its lease of 
these increasingly valuable lands. This will continue, unless reformed, until the year 
2051 with United Parkfs percentage of ski lease revenues increasing by only 1/2 of 1% 
for each twenty-year extension. The same unconscionable percentages and extensions 
apply to the Deer Valley Ski Lease, which in 1975 Royal Street offered to sublease to 
GPCC for ski development for seven times the percentage of annual ski revenue that 
Royal Street was required under the lease to pay to United Park. (R. 4751-52; 7940 at 
160-62) 
In sum, the district court erred in dismissing United Park's prayer for reformation 
of the Water Agreement and the Ski Leases. 
^C...continued) 
and says nothing about United Park's mining operations. GPCC does not argue that the 
water treatment costs, which were over $350,000 per year, were also foreseeable. 
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VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE RESORT 
AGREEMENTS 
A, The District Court Erred in Dismissing United Park's Claims 
for Breach of the Water Agreement. 
United Park alleges that GPCC and Royal Street have breached the Water 
Agreement in two respects. First, they breached paragraph 14 of the Water Agreement 
in 1987 by filing bad faith protests with the State Engineer challenging United Park's 
application for an extension of time to resume use of certain Group II water rights which 
are subject to United Park's prior, perpetual reservation. (R. 4831-32). Second, GPCC 
has breached its duty under paragraph 5 to pay for the cost of treating the water from 
the Ontario No.2 Drain Tunnel. These substantial costs to United Park, which began in 
1982, average over $350,000 each year, and totaled some $2,650,000 at the end of 1989. 
(R. 4833) As United Park demonstrated in its opening brief, the district court's dismissal 
of these claims on the ground of waiver was error. See U.P. Br. at 71-72. 
Similarly erroneous was the district court's holding that payment of the purchase 
price under the Water Agreement has "cured" these breaches. As described above, United 
Park's rights under the reservation continue after payment and conveyance. Defendants' 
bad faith protests have jeopardized United Park's continuing rights to the reserved flows. 
Payment of the purchase price does not and cannot cure this breach. 
Nor can payment of the purchase price "cure" GPCC's failure to pay for water 
treatment in the past or in the future. Clearly, GPCC's failure to pay for treatment of 
the Ontario Drain Tunnel flow between 1982 and 1989 was not cured by payment of the 
purchase price in January 1990. Under the Water Agreement, the duty to pay for water 
treatment is separate from and independent of the duty to pay the purchase price for the 
water. (R. 5090-91) There is also no basis for GPCC's contention that its duty to treat 
the Ontario Tunnel water ended with the payment of the purchase price. Nothing in the 
Water Agreement suggests that result, and GPCC presented no evidence suggesting that 
such an unconscionable result was intended by the parties. 
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For the first time on this appeal, GPCC argues that it has no duty to pay or 
reimburse the costs of water treatment because the water is not being "used for the 
purposes of [GPCC]."34 GPCC misleads the Court in asserting that it has not been using 
the Ontario water for the "purposes of [GPCC]." The Ontario No. 2 Drain Tunnel water 
is part of the Group II water rights subject to United Park's reservation. While United 
Park uses some Group II water rights for mine maintenance purposes, it does not 
currently use all the Group II water. Under the Welter Agreement, GPCC and Royal 
Street have the right and affirmative obligation to use water not being used by United 
Park to protect the water from forfeiture. (R. 4824; 5090). After assuming that 
obligation, GPCC cannot now claim that it has not been using the water.35 
Furthermore, GPCC has at times leased the Ontario water to downstream users. 
See Addendum C. Clearly this is a use of the water for the "purposes of [GPCC]" within 
the meaning of the Water Agreement. At the very least, the issue of GPCC's use of the 
Ontario water creates a question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary 
judgment36. 
Thus, the breaches of the Water Agreement have been neither cured nor waived 
and the district court's dismissal of these claims must be reversed. 
M
 Paragraph 5 of the Water Purchase Agreement provides that "[GPCC] shall, at 
its sole expense, treat or purify the Purchased Flow to the extent the same is necessary 
before it may be used for the purposes of [GPCC]." (R. 5091). 
35
 GPCC's position seems to be that it can use the water if it pleases, but it does 
not have to inform United Park if or how it is using the water, nor does it have to pay 
any cost of treating the water. This position simply jeopardizes the continuing viability 
of the water right. Further, if GPCC is in fact not using the water, its non-use provides 
another equitable basis for reformation of the Water Agreement to remove any 
restrictions on United Park's use of the Group II water, to prevent forfeiture of the 
water right. 
36
 GPCC cites National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
for the proposition that it is the party owning the point source, not the user or owner 
of the water which by statute must pay the costs of water treatment. That case is 
simply irrelevant here, because the issue in this case is not which party has a statutory 
duty to treat the water, but whether GPCC is contractually obligated to pay water 
treatment costs. Nothing in the federal Clean Water Act or Utah's statutory equivalent 
precludes enforcement of GPCC's contractual duties. 
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B. The District Court Erred in Dismissing United Park's Claim That GPCC and 
Royal Street Have Breached the Ski Leases By Understating Lift Revenues. 
United Park contends that GPCC and Royal Street have breached the Ski Leases 
by failing to include in their lift revenue calculations (a fractional percent of which 
United Park receives as rent) the value of lift tickets traded for goods and services, 
given on a discounted basis or given for free. As United Park demonstrated in its 
opening brief, the district court's dismissal of this claim on the grounds of waiver or 
estoppel is unsupportable because neither GPCC nor Royal Street presented any evidence 
below to establish the essential elements of waiver or estoppel. See U.P. Br. at 71-72. 
Neither GPCC nor Royal Street, in their briefs on appeal, make any effort to cure this 
fatal defect.37 
Even if defendants had established waiver or estoppel as to underpayments 
occurring before 1985, that would not bar United Park's claim for full and accurate 
payments from 1985 forward. Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(landlords did not waive right to seek arrearages of rent by accepting tenant's rental 
payments). Thus, the district court erred in dismissing the claims for breach of the Ski 
Leases. 
IX. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S TRESPASS CLAIMS 
A. The Town Lift Trespass Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed. 
In 1980, the Third Amendment to the Resort Area Lease removed the area subject 
to the Town Lift trespass from the Lease. Nothing in the Third Amendment purports to 
condition its effectiveness on the exercise of the Sweeney Option. (R. 5379-83) The 
execution of the Third Amendment was not required under paragraph 14 of the Lease. 
37
 The only evidence cited by GPCC is the deposition testimony of LaMar Osika to 
the effect that it never occurred to him that the value of complimentary lift tickets were 
to be included in lift revenues. (R. 7944 at 120) Mr. Osika's testimony is insufficient 
to establish waiver or estoppel by the clear and convincing standard required. Berglund 
and Berglund, Inc. v. Contributions Bureau, 784 P.2d 933 (Mont. 1990). Moreover, that 
testimony says nothing about United Park's knowledge or the propriety of defendants' 
exclusion of the value of discounted passes or passes traded for good and services. 
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Removal of property from the Lease under paragraph 14 is automatic without the need 
for a lease amendment.38 Nonetheless, the parties chose to execute the Third Amendment 
which unconditionally removed the described property from the Lease. This Amendment 
was supported by consideration: GPCC was afforded a right of first refusal to purchase 
the property which it declined to exercise. See Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian 
Athletic Ass'n., 670 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Idaho 1983) (right of first refusal is consideration). 
Thus, the Third Amendment effectively removed the property from the Lease in 1980, 
GPCC's subsequent construction of the Town Lift over this property was a trespass and 
the district court erred in dismissing this claim. 
B. The Maintenance Building Trespass Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed. 
GPCC does not dispute United Park's factual contention that its maintenance 
building encroaches on United Park land which is not subject to the Ski Leases.39 As 
United Park demonstrated, there is no evidence that United Park ever consented to this 
trespass. U.P. Br. at 72-3 & n.35, GPCC's argument and the district court's holding 
that paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement requires United Park to permit GPCC to 
Paragraph 14 of the Resort Area Lease as amended provides: 
In the event of sale of a portion of the Leased Premises to Lessee or to a 
third party pursuant to this Paragraph 14, this Lease shall be deemed 
terminated with relation to the portion of the Leased Premises so sold by 
Lessor, and said property shall for all purposes hereof be deemed to have 
been deleted from the Leased Premises and shall no longer be subject to the 
terms or conditions of this Lease as Amended. 
(R. 5321). 
39
 United Park adequately supported this contention in its opposition to defendants' 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 4849-52) 
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building facilities on United Park's land is wholly insupportable.40 Paragraph 19 only 
requires United Park to grant easements reasonably necessary for ingress and egress and 
to cooperate with GPCC when both parties are conducting operations on the same 
property. The maintenance building trespass is not necessary for ingress or egress to 
property sold by United Park to GPCC under the Land Agreement. And the duty of 
cooperation applies only where GPCC has a right to be conducting operations on a piece 
of property. GPCC has no right to build facilities on land which United Park neither sold 
nor leased to GPCC. Thus, the district court fs dismissal of this claim must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above and those set forth in United Park's opening brief, the 
judgment dismissing United Park's Amended Complaint must be reversed and the case 
remanded for the completion of discovery and trial. 
DATED this of April, 1991. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
DAVID B. WATKISS 
PERRIN R. LOVE 
CAROLYN COX 
Attorneys for 
United Park City Mines Company 
40
 Paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement provides that 
It is also understood and agreed that UPC will, upon request, grant to TMRC 
such easements over its properties as may be reasonably necessary for 
ingress and egress to and from any of the Subject Properties, provided that 
the nature and duration of such easements shall be subject to the approval 
of UPC and the use thereof shall be subject to such reasonable conditions 
and restrictions as UPC shall impose. 
(R. 4913). 
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Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq, 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
139 East South Temple, #2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael F. Jones, Esq. 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
Suite 1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South S ta te S t ree t 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Randy L. Dryer, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South S ta t e S t ree t , Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Merlin O. Baker, Esq. 
Jonathan A. Dibble, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main St ree t 
P . O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
James A. Boevers, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard W. Giauque, Esq. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Donald N. Dirks, Esq. 
DAVIS, POLK & WARDELL 
One Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, New York 10005 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
614 Main S t ree t , Suite 401 
Post Office Box 4485 
Park City, Utah 84060-4485 
Howard L. Edwards, Esq. 
515 South Flower S t ree t 
Los Angeles, California 90071 
Wendy A. Faber 
ROYAL STREET 
7620 Royal S t ree t East 
Suite No. 205 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Tab A 
MUTUAL CONSENT AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT 
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC. ("GPI"), PARK PROPERTIES, INC. 
("PPI"), UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY ("UPCM"), ROYAL STREET 
LAND COMPANY ("Land"), and GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY ("GPCC"), 
by and through their respective counsel, hereby agree as follows: 
•1. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as the Trustee 
and Escrow Agent ("The Agent"), pursuant to the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement dated October 11, 1975, is authorized mfC^fltU^mmtiaB^ to, • _! 
uptA (p.nft«n nqottf; effUt macijpuKt" altcxruu</i pane£PJ^//ffh 
immediately disburse from escrow.the* following sums: ' G^\ 
(a) the sum of $1,512,240.27 (plus any accrued 
interest attributable thereto) to GPI; 
(b) the sum of $381,395.59 (plus any accrued 
interest attributable thereto) to PPI; and 
(c) the sum of $984,087.33 (plus any accrued 
interest attributable thereto) to UPCM. 
2. The accrued interest will be calculated as soon as 
practical after the disbursement of the amounts set forth above. 
The method of calculating the accrued interest and the amounts 
proposed to be disbursed to each party will be circulated to the 
parties for their approval in a form similar hereto. 
3. The Agent is authorized and directed to immediately 
deliver from escrow the following instruments to the following 
parties: 
(a) to GPCC those instruments identified as "o," 
"x," "bb" and "cc" in the Escrow Agreement; and 
(b) to Land those instruments identified as "M V S 
f,uu" and wvv" in the Escrow Agreement. 
4. By the execution of this Mutual Consent and Hold Harmless 
Agreement, and by receipt of ski lease rentals pursuant to this 
Agreement, no party to this Agreement shall be deemed to have cert.fie 
to the accuracy of ski lease revenue on which the ski lease rentals 
were calculated. 
5. Each of the signatories hereto shall hold First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A., harmless from any and all claims arising from 
the actions taken pursuant to this Agreement. 
6. Each of the signatories hereto represent they are 
authorized to execute this Agreement on behalf of their respective 
clients and to bind said clients to the terms herein. This Agreement 
may be signed in counterpart originals, which taken together shall 
constitute a single document. 
DATED this ^IfjVday of April, 1988. 
tfendy A. /Taber, Esq. Randy Ly^Dcryer, Esq.
 { 
attorney ^ ror Land ^-% Attorney for GPI and 
Wendy 
Attorney 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. tltateflflaJx-ltayga»d PtfUfp fV(n>dff(£5 
Attorney for GPCC Attorney for UPCM 
MOTUAL CONSENT AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT 
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC. ( "GPI" ) , PARK PROPERTIES, INC. 
( " P P I " ) , UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY ("UPCM"), ROYAL STREET 
LAND COMPANY ( " L a n d " ) , and GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY ("GPCC"), by 
and th rough t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l , he reby ag ree as f o l l o w s : 
1. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank of Utah , N .A . , as T r u s t e e and 
Escrow Agent ( " t h e A g e n t " ) , p u r s u a n t t o the S u b s t i t u t e d Escrow 
Agreement da t ed Oc tobe r 11,. 1975, i s a u t h o r i z e d to immediate ly 
d i s b u r s e from esc row, upon w r i t t e n r e q u e s t of the r e c i p i e n t , a l l 
o r any p a r t of the f o l l o w i n g sums: 
(a) The sum of $ 1 6 7 , 4 1 0 . 8 0 t o United Park C i t y 
Mines , s a i d sum c o n s i s t i n g of t h e sum of $56 ,772 .39 as 
u n d i s b u r s e d i n t e r e s t a c c r u e d th rough J u n e 30 , 1988 and the sum of. 
$110,6 3 8 . 4 1 as u n d i s b u r s e d p r i n c i p a l r e c e i v e d by Agent through 
J u n e 30 , 1988; 
(b) The sum of $ 9 2 1 , 6 5 0 . 4 6 t o GPI, c o n s i s t i n g of 
t h e sum of $ 1 2 4 , 8 3 9 . 1 9 as u n d i s b u r s e d i n t e r e s t acc rued through 
J u n e 30 , 1988 and t h e sum of $ 7 9 6 , 8 1 1 . 2 7 as u n d i s b u r s e d p r i n c i p a l 
r e c e i v e d by Agent t h rough J u n e 30 , 1988; and 
(c) The sum of $ 2 3 0 , 5 9 6 . 3 7 t o PPI , c o n s i s t i n g of 
t h e sum of $ 3 1 , 3 9 3 . 5 5 as u n d i s b u r s e d i n t e r e s t acc rued through 
J u n e 30 , 1988 and t h e sum of $ 1 9 9 , 2 0 2 . 8 2 as u n d i s b u r s e d p r i n c i p a l 
r e c e i v e d by Agent th rough J u n e 30, 1988 . 
2 . By the e x e c u t i o n of t h i s Mutual Consent and Hold 
Harmless Agreement , no p a r t y to t h i s Agreement s h a l l be deemed to 
have c e r t i f i e d to the a c c u r a c y of s k i l e a s e revenue on which s k i 
r e n t a l s were c a l c u l a t e d . 
3. Each of the signatories hereto shall hold the 
Agent harmless from any and all claims arising from the actions 
taken pursuant to this Agreement. 
4. Each of the signatories hereto represent they are 
authorized to execute this Agreement o>n behalf of their respec-
tive clients and to bind said clients to the terms herein. This 
Agreement may be signed in counterpart originals, which taken 
together shall constitute a single document. 
Dated: 
Dated: ^K(*A ^ 7 (%&f$ 
Dated: 
GORDON STRACHAN, ESQ. 
Attorney for GPCC 
D a t e d : 
KICHARD GiAUQUE, ESQ. 
A t t o r n e y f o r Land 
2 3 2 : 0 7 0 8 8 8 A 
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RANDY L. DRYER, ESQ. 
A t t o r n e y f o r GPI and PPI 
MICHAEL E . HEYftEND , • ESQ., 
A t t o r n e y f o r UPCM 
-A 
MQTUAL CONSENT AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT 
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC. ("GPI"), PARK PROPERTIES, INC. 
("PPI"), UNITED PARR CITY MINES COMPANY ("UPCM"), ROYAL STREET 
LAND COMPANY ("Land")/ and GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY ("GPCC"), by 
and through their respective counsel, hereby agree as follows: 
1. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee and 
Escrow Agent ("the Agent"), pursuant to the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement dated October 11, 1975, is authorized to immediately 
disburse from escrow, upon written request of the recipient, all 
or any part of the following sums: 
(a) The sum of $167,410.80 to United Park City 
Mines, said sum consisting of the sum of $56,772.39 as 
undisbursed interest accrued through June 30, 1988 and the sum of 
$110,6 38.41 as undisbursea principal received by Agent through 
June 30, 1988; 
(b) The sum of $921,650.46 to GPI, consisting of 
the sum of $124,839.19 as undisbursed interest accrued through 
June 30, 1988 and the sum of $796,811.27 as undisbursed principal 
received by Agent through June 30, 1988; and 
(c) The sum of $230,596.37 to PPI, consisting of 
the sum of $31,393.55 as undisbursed interest accrued through 
June 30, 1988 and the sum of $199,202.82 as undisbursed principal 
received by Agent through June 30, 1988. 
2. By the execution of this Mutual Consent and Hold 
Harmless Agreement, no party to this Agreement shall be deemed to 
have certified to the accuracy of ski lease revenue on which ski 
rentals were calculated. 
3. Each of the signatories hereto shall hold the 
Agent harmless from any and all claims arising from the actions 
taken pursuant to this Agreement. 
4. Each of the signatories hereto represent they are 
authorized to execute this Agreement on behalf of their respec-
tive clients and to bind said clients to the terms herein. This 
Agreement may be signed in counterpart originals, which taken 
together shall constitute a single document. 
D a t e d : 7/2? ISS 0 \ • l^Wf^-i 
RANDY Iy/t)RYER, ESQ 
A t t d r n e k t o r GPI and 
Dated.: 
MICHAEL F. HEYREND, ESQ. 
Attorney for UPCM 
Dated: *7 
• nnpnnu QTP&rwAM -pen GORDON STRACHAN, ESQ. 
Attorney for GPCC 
Dated : rAf/fr v—*~r 
2 3 2 : 0 7 0 8 8 8 A 
- 2 -
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[Counsel Submitting Listed on Signature Page-] £Ai-« :. • :T;.«-r 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; et al., 
Defendants. 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
Intervenor. 
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a national banking 
association; et al.. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff United Park City Mines Company (-United 
Park-), and defendants Greater Park City Company (-GPCC*), 
Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. (*AMOT-), Morgan Guaranty and 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. C-86-3347 
and 
Civil No. C-86-8907 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Trust Company of New York (-Morgan"), Fidelity Bank of 
Philadelphia (-Fidelity-), Greater Properties, Inc. (-GPI-), 
Park Properties, Inc. (-PPI-), and First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. (-First Security-) hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. On December 31, 1990, GPCC made final payment to 
United Park on the Renewal Promissory Note, and requested that 
United Park release the Mortgage dated October 11, 1975, which 
Mortgage was executed to secure payment of the Renewal 
Promissory Note. 
2. First Security, as the Trustee and Escrow Agent 
under the Substituted Escrow Agreement dated October 11, 1975, 
is authorized and directed by the parties hereto to promptly 
(1) deliver to GPCC the Renewal Promissory Note marked -Paid in 
Full- and (2) disburse to United Park those monies paid to the 
Escrow Agent by GPCC on December 31, 1990 under the terms of 
that certain Renewal Promissory Note dated October 11, 1975, 
and all accrued interest thereon. 
3. United Park hereby agrees to execute a Release of 
Mortgage which will release the Mortgage dated October 11, 1975 
(identified as instrument (h) in the Substituted Escrow 
Agreement). 
4. By execution of this Stipulation, no party shall 
be deemed to have waived any claims, or defenses thereto, it 
may have in this litigation. 
-2-
5- The parties further acknowledge and agree: 
a. That the defendants have argued and will 
continue to argue that United Park's acceptance of escrow 
monies and release of instruments of title, among other things, 
has constituted and will constitute a waiver of certain claims 
asserted by United Park in the above-captioned litigation* 
b. That United Park has argued and will 
continue to argue that no such waiver has occurred or will 
occur; and 
c. That it is the intent of the parties that 
the execution of this Stipulation shall have no effect on their 
respective positions as refej££Jiced above, 
DATED this ^ V ' day of January, 1991, 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
ftborneys for Defendants 
greater Park City Company 
and Alpine Meadows of 
Tahoe, Inc. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
Attorneys for United Park 
City Mines Company 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
DAVIS POLK & WARDELL 
itf .j>, 
AttoVney^Afor Defend^ rfitis 
Greader (properties, lire. 
Park Properties, Inc., 
Morgan Guaranty & Trust 
Company of New York, 
Fidelity Bank of 
Philadelphia 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
u, • "N v ^ 
Attorneys for First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A, 
-3-
MAILING CERTIFICATE - 7 ^ " 
I hereby certify that, on the (yvft day of January, 
1991, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION to the following: 
David K. Watkiss 
David B. Watkiss 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
Richard W. Giauque 
Wendy A. Faber 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
139 East South Temple, #2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael F. Jones 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
Suite 1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Randy L. Dryer 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Merlin O. Baker 
Jonathan A. Dibble 
Keith A. Kelly 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 




Gordon Strachan, Esq. 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
614 Main Street, Suite 401 
P.O. Box 4485 
Park City, Utah 84060-4485 
Donald N. Dirks 
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL 
One Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, New York 10005 
Howard L. Edwards, Esq. 
515 South Flower Street 
Los Angeles, California 90071 
-5-
TabB 
CONVEYANCE OF WATER RIGHTS 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah, Grantor, hereby 
grants and conveys to GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion, Grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other 
valuable considerations, all of the right, title and interest of 
Grantor in the right of use in and to the following identified 
and described water and water rights, to-wit: 
Utah State Engineer's 
Description and Location Filing Number 
Group I 
Spiro Tunnel, diverted at a point 
1,950 feet N and 1,680 feet W 
of the SE corner of Section 8, 
T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM 
Group II 
Ontario Drain Tunnel, diverted 
at a point which bears S 46°52' 
W 2,398.5 feet from the NE corner 
of Section 24, T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM 
Lady Morgan Spring, diverted at 
a point which bears S 4°2' E 
2,715 feet from the N quarter 
corner, Section 29, T 2 S, 
R 4 E, SLM 
Hannauer Spring & Tunnel, diverted 
at a point N 40 feet and W 450 
feet from the S quarter corner, 
Section 20, T 2 S, R 4 E. SLM 
Mountain Spring Tunnel (Shadow 
Lake) Spring 6c Tunnel, diverted 
at a point N 600 feet and E 260 
feet of the W quarter corner, 
Section 30, T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM 
Newpci_ ::i'nc Tunnel, diverted at 
a point N 800 feet and 300 feet 
E of the W quarter corner of 
















Description and Location 
California Mine Tunnel, diverted 
at a point N 100 feet and West 
970 feet from the S quarter corner 
of Section 19,. T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM 
Jeanette or Thaynes Tunnel, S 280 
feet and E 800 feet of the E 
quarter corner. Section 25, 
T 2 S, R 3 E, SLM 
Alliance Tunnel, diverted at a 
point N 1,070 feet and E 1,270 
feet from the SW corner, Section 
21, T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM 
Blood's or Judge Lake, diverted at: 
a point which bears N 19°1' E 
654.1 feet from the E quarter 
corner of Section 36, T 2 S, 
R 4 E, SLM 
Keetley Spring, diverted at a 
point which bears S 37°58' W 
741 feet from the NE corner, 
Section 23, T 2 S, R 4 E. SLM 

















Excepting and reserving unto Grantor the prior right 
to use, or to lease or grant to others the right to use, 
for mining, milling and related ptirposes, the first 
twenty-eight hundred and fifty (2,850)^gallons per minute 
from the aggregate water yield of the water and water 
rights identified and described in Group II above. 
Grantor covenants and agrees that it will hereafter 
execute, without warranty, and deliver to Grantee such further 
instruments of assignment or conveyance, or furnish such other 
instruments from its records as it may possess and which may be 
required by the State Engineer of Utah to complete transfer of 
the water and water rights hereinabove identified from Grantor 
to Grantee, subject always, however, to the exception and reserva-
tion to Grantor, i*-* 1^«sees and assigns, of the water and water 
rights as herein set forth. 
The officers who sign this conveyance hereby certify 
-2-
that this conveyance and the transfer represented hereby were 
duly authorized under resolutions duly adopted by the Board of 
Directors of each of the Grantors at lawful meetings duly held 
and attended by quorums. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, United Park City Mines Company, 
Grantor, as aforesaid, has caused this instrument to be signed 
by its duly authorized officers with its corporate seal affixed 
this 10th day of October 1975. 
By 
ATTEST: ^n ^- President 
2D PARK CITY MINES COMPANY 
secretary 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this /p*~ day of flffr/**. 1975, personally 
appeared before me MILES P. R0MNEi7 who, being by me duly sworn, 
did say that he is the President of UNITED PARK CITY MINES 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, and that the within and foregoing 
Conveyance of Water Rights was signed in behalf of said corpora-
tion by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and 
said MILES P. ROMNEY duly acknowledged to me that said corpora-




Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 




In Account With 
Midway irrigation Co. 
Midway, Utah 8UOU9 
Date 3 19 75 
invoice No. 
Your Order No. 
oi oo ooo 113 oia 872 
Water b i l l i n g on the Ontario Daly # 2 Tunnel for 
3.13 c f s G$60 per CFS for 1S7U see attached 




Terms Net. No Discount 
A Subsidiary of Greater Park City Company 
BOK 781 • F' X <Jliy, u mi l 5 4 u o u • r u u u c ^ ^--~ ~ — 
INVOICE 
In Account With Date 
Invoice 
Your Order No. 
i s i s re i i i f o r s r y a u t h a t tiio fallovria;*- i s a u 3 : 
2 Shares; a f Midw2.y I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t i:/76 
S a l a a c e Due 5- 1 0 . 0 0 
TERMS: NET, due upon receipt odf billing. A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid 
past-due balance, at a monthly rate of 1% percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE 
OP 18 PERCENT. £ p —Q32<16 
G P C - 18679 
Box 781, t fc City; Vtab 8466b- Phone $ 64-9-81I1 
INVOICE 
.Your Order Na 




in Account With 
... z v * * ~ 3r. «*•* 3*- -r 
Date 
Invoice 
Your Order No. 
•16-77 
h i s i s t.a iafcrrxr yau?* raa:t^ t h e f o l l o w i n g i s* duo ; 
j^SItareSf a F iiidiMky D e r i v a t i o n D i s t r i c t l*i76 
3 a l a n e * Due: Us.ao 
TERMS: NET, doe npo» receipt of billing. A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid 
past-doe balance, at a monthly rat* of 1% percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE 
OF i a PERCENT-
<--£&-m**-
B<xt78I, K w * Cttyt Utah 84060 • Phone {fi J 649-8111 
INVOICE 
m Account Wftfr Date : - 2 5 - 7 7 
invoice 
Your Order No. 
. : i i s i s t o ia-foriX'/ottr t l tar c?ie- f a l i a ^ i n r i s duo: 
2 Skaresh Mitfw-ay I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t li?76 
3*aXaace Sue S^OO 
TERMS: NET,, dua upon receipt of biffing; A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid 
past-due balance^ at a monthly rate of V/2 percent per month; this represents an ANNUAfeRMnR^ M Q 
OF 18 PERCENT. ^ _ _ _ _ j ( S i 3 ? H ^ 3 ^ 
: , „ GPC- 19632 
BOK7HU f^rK luiiy, utcuA 
INVOICE 
In Account With 
j . : ." . or-- :cr-vjt ^ r i v o 
Date 
invoice 
Your Order No. 
h i s is t o iJiiTarrr yotr o f t h e f o l l o w i n g b i l l i n g ? 
I LIZ S h a r e * af" Midway I r r i g a t i o n a i s t r i c t 19 76 
Ea^Lsuice tftn* m.sa 
TERMS: NET,, due upon receipt of billing. A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid 
past-due balance,, at a monthly rate of 1 M> percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE 
OF 18 PERCENT. ^ 0325 tT
 = 
6 P C - 18683 
B0K78T, 2. * City; Utah 8 4 0 6 0 • P h o n e f£ J. 64-9-8111 
I N V O I C E 
in Account with Date 
Invoice 
Your Order No. 
T h i s i s u x , b i I L x«fc. f a r r t k a faELaxixig:: 
J S h a r e s * j^r \ t t iLJar&F I r r i j r t t i G r * D i s t r i c t 1P75 
b a l a n c e - Qua tf;3-.oe 
TERMS: NET; due upon receipt of biffing* A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid 
past-due balance, a t a monthly rate of t% percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE 0FiapERCENr
- r——r^roaa^: 
RPC- 1 8 6 8 4 
ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY 
WILLIAM A. PRINCE 
Vice President -Controller 
P. O. BOX 8 8 9 
1700 PARK A V E N U E 
PARK CITY r UTAH 8 4 0 6 0 
T E L E P H O N E 
8 0 1 / 6 4 9 - 8 5 8 5 
August 21, 1980 
Ms. Vicki Ferrante 
Park City Ski Corp. 
P. 0. Box 39 
Park City, UT 84060 
Dear Vicki: 
We did not receive a copy of the billing to LeGrande Parsons (Ontario 
Tunnel) and Midway Irrigation Company for the current year. 
Kindly send us a copy of your latest billings. 
Many thanks. 
Yours truly, 
William A. Prince 
WAP:Imp 
GfP 02042 
6 P C - IZitV 
c 
c 
Royal Street Land Ci 
1700 Park Avenue, S 
P. 0 . Box 889 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Ms. Vicki Ferrante 
Park City Ski Corp, 
P. 0. Box 39 
Park City, UT 84060 
ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY 
WILLIAM A. PRINCE 
Vice PTMidtnt-Controltor 
P. O. BOX 880 
1700 PARK AVENUE 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 
TELEPHONE 
801/649-8585 
September 22, 1980 
Ms. Vicki Ferrante 
Park City Ski Corp. 
P. 0. Box 39 
Park City, UT 84060 
Dear Vicki: 
Thank you for the current year billings for LeGrande Parsons (Ontario 
Tunnel) and Midway Irrigation Company which I received today. 
Yours truly, 
Will iam A. Prince 
Imp 
$P 02041 
GPC- 1 3 6 i n 
